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Abstract
Road congestion in urban environments, especially near signalized intersections, has been a
major cause of significant fuel and time waste. Various solutions have been proposed to solve the
problem of increasing idling times and number of stops of vehicles at signalized intersections,
ranging from infrastructure-based techniques, such as dynamic traffic light control systems, to
vehicle-based techniques that rely on optimal speed computation. However, all of the vehicle-
based solutions introduced to solve the problem have approached the problem from a single
vehicle point of view. Speed optimization for vehicles approaching a traffic light is an indi-
vidual decision-making process governed by the actions/decisions of the other vehicles sharing
the same traffic light. Since the optimization of other vehicles’ speed decisions is not taken
into consideration, vehicles selfishly compete over the available green light; as a result, some
of them experience unnecessary delay which may lead to increasing congestion. In addition,
the integration of dynamic traffic light control system with vehicle speed optimization such that
coordination and cooperation between the traffic light and vehicles themselves has not yet been
addressed.
As a step toward technological solutions to popularize the use of autonomous vehicles, this
thesis introduces a game-theoretic-based cooperative speed optimization framework to minimize
the idling times and number of stops of vehicles at signalized intersections. This framework
consists of three modules to cover issues of autonomous vehicle individual speed optimization,
information acquisition and conflict recognition, and cooperative speed decision making. It relies
on a linear programming optimization technique and game theory to allow autonomous vehicles
heading toward a traffic light cooperate and agree on certain speed actions such that the average
idling times and number of stops are minimized. In addition, the concept of bargaining in game
theory is introduced to allow autonomous vehicles trade their right of passing the traffic light
with less or without any stops. Furthermore, a dynamic traffic light control system is introduced
to allow the cooperative autonomous vehicles cooperate and coordinate with the traffic light
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to further minimize their idling times and number of stops. Simulation has been conducted
in MATLAB to test and validate the proposed framework under various traffic conditions and
results are reported showing significant reductions of average idling times and number of stops
for vehicles using the proposed framework as compared to a non-cooperative speed optimization
algorithm. Moreover, a platoon-based autonomous vehicle speed optimization scheme is posed
to minimize the average idling times and number of stops for autonomous vehicles connected in
platoons. This platoon-based scheme consists of a linear programming optimization technique
and intelligent vehicle decision-making algorithm to allow vehicles connected in a platoon and
approaching a signalized intersection decide in a decentralized manner whether it is efficient
to be part of the platoon or not. Simulation has been conducted in MATLAB to investigate
the performance of this platoon-based scheme under various traffic conditions and results are
reported, showing that vehicles using the proposed scheme achieve lower average values of idling
times and number of stops as compared to two other platoon scenarios.
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In the USA alone, there were about six million vehicle crashes in 2010. Human errors caused ap-
proximately 93% of these crashes [1]. Over the past few years, technology and automobile indus-
tries have concentrated on the human driving process in their efforts to automate the transporta-
tion system. Recently, various car models have started to include automatic characteristics and
features, such as parking assistant systems that automatically steer vehicles into available parking
spaces. Some automobile companies have made leaps toward manufacturing Autonomous Vehi-
cles (AVs), which can implement different levels of automatic functions as a means of achieving
a safer and more efficient transportation system. AVs are believed by many industrial companies
and stakeholders to have the potential to dramatically improve the current transportation system.
The next section provides a brief introduction to AVs.
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1.1 Autonomous Vehicles
AVs, also called Self-Driving Vehicles (SDVs), have different levels of intelligence and capabil-
ity to perform partial or full automatic driving tasks. AVs can be categorized, based on their level
of autonomy, into four major levels [2–4]. In Level-one AVs, the driver is in full control of the
vehicle, and the automation is limited to very specific control functions, such as cruise control,
anti-lock brakes and an electronic stability control system. The automation of Level-two AVs
is extended to multiple and more integral control functions, such as Adaptive Cruise Control
(ACC), Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC), lane centering and lane changing, and
autonomous parking capability. Other than when these automatic systems are functioning, the
driver is responsible for monitoring the roadway at all times. Level-three AVs are able to mon-
itor the surrounding environment and navigate autonomously, so the drivers are not expected to
monitor the roadway at all times. However, under certain critical conditions the drivers must be
attentive and ready to take back control of the vehicle for a short period of time. The Google
car [3] is an instance of this level of self-driving (Figure 1.1). Level-four AVs are those capable
of monitoring the surrounding environment and performing all driving tasks autonomously for
an entire trip. The driver may input a destination to the vehicle, but is not expected to intervene
during operation. Therefore, these AVs may operate without passengers or with passengers who
cannot drive (e.g., disabled people, non-drivers or elderly people, etc).
Reportedly, AVs have multiple major positive impacts on the transportation system, such
as reduced driver stress and public transportation cost; improved mobility of the non-driving,
disabled and elderly people; reduced accident risks; increased road capacity (e.g., by forming
platoons of vehicles travelling in a row with safe headway distances, resulting in less speed vari-
ations); and reduced parking costs [1–4]. However, many issues need to be resolved before AVs
can be practically operated on the roads. The next section addresses a few challenges associated
with the widespread development and use of AVs.
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Figure 1.1: The autonomous car of Google Corporation [3].
1.2 Challenges
Security and privacy risks are one category among the many important issues to be resolved be-
fore AVs are widely marketed. In scenarios of comprehensive AV adoption, Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication systems may be vulnerable to data
abuse [2]. Hence, the communication systems must be robust and controllable in cases such as
when there is cyber attack risk. In addition, in order to enhance road safety and driver conve-
nience, AVs require high-technology sensors, special navigation systems, and software upgrades;
as a result, purchase prices will be increased by thousands of dollars. Also, these technological
components must meet high installation, testing, and maintenance standards, which add more
cost to the ownership of AVs [3]. Consequently, low and middle income people will not be able
to afford AVs. Moreover, laws for the liability, standardization, and certification have to be leg-
islated. There are concerns about who owns the risk when highly autonomous vehicles crash;
therefore, solutions to legalize and legislate the use of AVs have to be found [1].
Most importantly, the impact of the wide use of AVs on road congestion, especially in urban
environments, is uncertain and has to be investigated. On one hand, AVs will have many positive
impacts on the transportation system, such as reducing public transportation cost due to fewer
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human-driving activities, reducing public transportation demand through increased rates of car-
sharing and better mobility of the non-driving, disabled, and elderly people. Moreover, a high
adoption of AVs will reduce parking costs as many people can drive to work or school then
program their AVs to return home while they are working or studying. On the other hand, all
of these positive impacts may increase the number of vehicles on roads; consequently, traffic
congestion in urban areas might rise. As forming platoons of vehicles reduces the inter-vehicle
spacing and speed variations on roads, this could improve the road capacity on highways but only
when the penetration rate is high [3]. Therefore, the impacts of AVs on road congestion in urban
areas cannot be predicted and need to be addressed through research. It is reported in [2] that in
order to obtain positive impacts on road congestion, cooperation between AVs and infrastructure
is necessary. Cooperative AV systems could improve traffic management, and therefore reduce
congestion in urban environments.
1.3 Motivation
Road congestion in urban environments, especially near Signalized Intersections (SIs), has been
a major cause of significant fuel waste and time delay. It is reported in [1] that in the USA every
year, 4.8 billion hours is wasted by traffic congestion. This significant delay costs around $100
billion of fuel waste and $23 billion due to congestion impacts on trucking operations. These
facts present a strong need to devise technological congestion-reduction techniques for AVs.
Long and cumulative idling times of vehicles at SIs are considered a major contributor to traffic
congestion within urban environments. Therefore, various solutions have been proposed to solve
the problem of the increasing idling times at Traffic Lights (TLs), ranging from infrastructure-
based techniques such as dynamic TL control systems [5–7] to vehicle-based techniques that rely
on vehicle optimal speed computation [8] [9]. These techniques have one common objective, that
is, to minimize the vehicles’ idling times and number of stops at TLs.
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However, all of the vehicle-based solutions introduced to solve the idling-time-minimization
problem have approached the problem from a single-vehicle point of view. In fact, traffic mobil-
ity is a function of all the vehicles sharing a travel resource and is dependent on the constraints
imposed by the environment and infrastructure. Therefore, it is natural for conflicts to arise be-
tween vehicles sharing the same travel resource. Speed optimization for vehicles approaching
a TL is an individual decision-making process governed by the actions/decisions of the other
vehicles sharing the same TL. Hence, interest conflicts are expected to occur. The major draw-
back of existing vehicle speed optimization solutions is that the optimization of other vehicles’
speed decisions is not taken into consideration. As a result, vehicles selfishly compete over the
available green light, often causing to each other unnecessary delays. In addition, even though
there has been interesting research conducted on dynamic TL control, the existing work does not
integrate dynamic TL control with vehicle speed optimization such that coordination and coop-
eration between the TL and vehicles are implemented to minimize idling times and number of
stops.
As a step forward in devising technological solutions to popularize the use of AVs, the main
motivating objective of this thesis is to introduce a game-theoretic AV speed optimization solu-
tion to minimize the idling times and number of stops of AVs at TLs. The main motivating ob-
jective for the rest of the research is to integrate the dynamic TL control with the game-theoretic
AV speed optimization such that a dynamic-TL-AV-based cooperative technological system is
devised to further minimize vehicles’ idling times and number of stops. The task of satisfying
the needs of many participants in a process is extremely complex. Game theory is recognized as a
solid mathematical platform to capture the complexity of team-aware optimization problems. For
instance, by cooperating with each other, vehicles can exchange strategic actions (e.g., speeds)
in some form of compensation to minimize their idling times at TLs. Both categories of game
theory, cooperative and non-cooperative, have been well developed and can be used to model the
AV minimization problem of idling times and number of stops as a cooperative strategic game.
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1.4 Thesis Objectives
Existing research on vehicle optimal speed computation to minimize the idling times and number
of stops at SIs does not consider the interaction and cooperation between vehicles. Thereby, the
aim of this thesis has been to allow AVs, travelling toward a TL, to interact and cooperate with
each other as well as with the TL control system such that the average idling times and number
of stops are minimized. Thus, to model the AV speed optimization as a cooperative process, the
following research objectives are addressed:
• Developing a problem formulation using game theory to address the interaction and coop-
eration between AVs approaching an SI.
• Investigating the feasibility and stability of the game-theoretic formulation.
• Developing a cooperative AV speed optimization solution framework to model the inter-
action and cooperation between AVs approaching an SI.
• Developing a bargaining model to allow the AVs heading toward a TL trade their rights of
passing through without delay.
• Developing a dynamic TL control system to allow the cooperative AVs interact and coop-
erate with the TL to achieve further minimization of idling times and number of stops.
• Investigating the impacts of speed optimization on connected-AV platoons when approach-
ing SIs.
• Finally, conducting extensive simulation experiments to test and validate the performance
of the introduced techniques.
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1.5 Thesis Organization
This thesis is divided into six chapters as follows: Chapter 2 provides extensive background
information and a literature review addressing the environmental, economical, and safety impacts
of AVs. In addition, challenges creating barriers to the widespread use of AVs are also discussed.
Then, research on vehicle-centric speed optimization techniques as well as dynamic TL control
systems is addressed. Following that, research conducted on vehicle speed control and platooning
systems such as ACC and CACC as well as fuzzy logic control is summarized. Background
information is presented on game theory as a team-based optimization platform with special
attention given to the shortest-path and congestion games.
Chapter 3 states the problem of increasing idling times and stop numbers at a TL as the
number of vehicles utilizing the TL increases. The idling time and stop number minimization
problem for AVs approaching a TL is formulated as a strategic game, and the stability of the
AV speed optimization game is discussed as well. Furthermore, this chapter introduces a game-
theoretic Cooperative Speed optimization Framework (CSOF) for solving the problem of idling
time and stop number minimization and achieving better traffic efficiency at SIs. Moreover, a
bargaining model using cooperative game theory is introduced to allow the AVs to trade their
rights of passing TLs without delay.
Chapter 4 presents a dynamic TL control system to allow coordination and cooperation be-
tween the cooperative AVs and the TL system as a pace forward for further minimization of
idling times and number of stops of AVs at TLs. This cooperative AV-TL control system consists
of decision making and control. The decision making is based a theoretic game structured as a
three-player game including the roads with green-light, roads with red-light, and the TL system.
The control part employs fuzzy logic to adjust the signal timings according the traffic volume on
the roadways.
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Chapter 6 addresses a platoon-based autonomous vehicle speed optimization scheme to min-
imize the idling times and number of stops of connected-AV platoons when approaching TLs.
This cooperative scheme consists of a speed optimization procedure conducted by the leader
of the platoon and intelligent algorithm for decision making to be run by every follower in the
platoon such that the average idling times and stop numbers of the AV-platoons are minimized.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes concluding remarks of what has been addressed in the thesis
and presents a discussion on the simulation results obtained within each chapter. In addition, a
future research plan is outlined, addressing the future directions of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
This chapter provides background and a literature review on a broad range of AV development,
challenges and problems. First, it addresses a number of research studies conducted with regards
to the road safety, environmental, and economical impacts of adopting AVs as an alternative to
conventional vehicles that are fully driven by humans. Second, issues and challenges associated
with the development of AVs are discussed with special attention given to AV speed optimization
and control near SIs. Third, it addresses research conducted on dynamic TL control systems and
their contribution to the problem of TL efficiency improvement. Finally, background information
on game theory is presented, focusing largely on shortest-path and congestion games as well as
the applications of game theory to the dynamic TL control.
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2.1 Safety, Environmental and Economical Impacts
According to [1], approximately 15 deaths per 100,000 people were caused by about six million
vehicle crashes in the USA in 2010. Of these crashes, 93% were caused by human error. In
addition, around 2.3 million people were treated in hospitals due to car crash injuries throughout
the USA in 2009. AVs can significantly reduce the accident rate and have positive impacts on
road safety since most of fatal accidents are caused by alcohol, distraction, drugs or fatigue. Even
if the accident is caused by a vehicle failure or the environment, additional human factors such as
inattention or speeding usually maximize the severity of the crash and thus, injury consequences.
A recent study in [2] states that only 5% of road crashes are due to vehicle failure. Accidents
resulting from human-driving mistakes constitute approximately 90% of the overall accident
rate; therefore, widespread AV adoption could reduce the overall accident rate by 90% [10].
The positive safety impacts of AVs are further extended to having vehicles that are much lighter
in weight and more energy efficient than conventional vehicles, as some safety features (e.g.,
reinforced steel bodies and airbags) can be neglected; according to one authority, 20% reduction
in weight corresponds to 20% increase in efficiency [1].
Green-house-gas emissions can also be reduced when AVs are widely used [2]. Since AVs
are equipped with high-technology capabilities, they will be able to navigate more efficiently and
smoothly than human drivers throughout any journey. When there is high market penetration of
AVs, major reductions can be reached with respect to parking problems, energy consumption and
CO2 emission [3]. Road vehicle automation could help increase road capacity by facilitating the
formation of platoons of vehicles, which reduce the road space required per vehicle [2]. Forming
platoons of vehicles alone would reduce fuel consumption on highways by about 20% [1]. Cited
by [4], the SARTRE project reports that with a platoon of vehicles, the fuel savings are approx-
imately 8% for the lead vehicle and 14% for the following vehicles when the average speed of
the platoon is 85 km/hour and the headway between every two vehicles is 6 m. The signifi-
10
cant benefit of AV emission reduction will be mainly in urban areas and achieved by minimizing
speed variations and stop-and-go driving. 50% congestion reduction results in 8% fewer traffic
accidents and 5% CO2 emission reduction [4]. Hence, AVs will certainly have a positive impact
on the environment.
In [1], KPMG LLP and the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) cooperatively conducted
a research study in which leading technologists, automotive industry leaders, academicians, and
stakeholders were interviewed on the convergence of AV adoption and implications for invest-
ment in AVs. They concluded that due to the benefits expected from using them, AVs will be
widely adopted in the coming few years. In addition, the Victoria Transport Policy Institute has
conducted a study in [3] about the impacts of the four levels of AVs on transportation planning.
This research pays attention to the benefits and costs of AVs, exploring the impacts on the park-
ing supply and public transit demand. The results illustrate that the adoption of AVs by wealthy
people will perhaps start in the 2020s or 2030s. The impacts of increasing safety, reducing road
congestion, reducing emissions, and reducing parking congestion will be significant only when
AVs become common, adopted by low-income people, most likely in the period from 2040s to
2060s. The widespread use of Level-four AVs can also reduce vehicle ownership by making
people rely more on self-driving taxis and car-sharing [11]. Moreover, in [10], a research study
sponsored by the Eno Center for Transportation presented the benefits of generally adopting AVs
in the USA. It is reported that AVs have the potential to reduce crashes, congestion, fuel con-
sumption, and parking needs; and to ease the mobility of elderly and disabled people. When the
market penetration rate of AVs is only 10%, the annual savings of the USA economy could reach
$25 billion. An anonymous survey with over 450 responses was conducted in [12] to explore the
feelings, beliefs and expectations of participants toward the technology of AVs. It is shown that
the productivity, efficiency and environmental impacts are accepted by the participants. However,
the cost and legal structures were not acceptable; therefore, it was concluded that the promotion
of AVs must be further developed so that the technology becomes accepted by the public.
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2.2 Challenges and Related Issues
Even though some levels of AVs will be convenient for long-distance travelers, non-drivers,
commercial drivers and disabled people, they require high-technology sensors, special naviga-
tion and mapping systems, and software upgrades; therefore, several thousands of dollars will
likely be added to the vehicle purchase and ownership prices. Thus, the cost of purchase and
ownership is expected to be prohibitively high. Furthermore, in order to enhance road safety
and passenger convenience, these technological components have to meet high manufacturing,
installation, testing, and maintenance standards, which add more costs on top of the vehicle pur-
chase and ownership prices [3]. For instance, $70,000 is the cost of the Light Detection and
Ranging (LIDAR) technology used by Google’s AV [1] [10]. Additional costs occur with other
sensors; consequently, such high costs will not be affordable by low-income people, constituting
a barrier to the large-scale market penetration of AVs. It is expected that when the purchase cost
is reduced, the adoption of AVs will likely be widened; hence, further developments to reduce
the total cost of purchase and ownership are greatly needed before stakeholders and investors
invest in this emerging technology [1].
AVs may also introduce some privacy and security concerns, such as cyber terrorism as they
are equipped with computer technology and V2V communications [2]. Communication systems
must be robust and safe from corruption and cyber attacks. It is expected that several security
issues will emerge when AVs become popular. For instance, hackers or unauthorized parties
may capture data and compromise the vehicle owner by tracking the vehicle or identifying the
owner’s residence. Furthermore, hackers could provide fake information to drivers or attack the
whole transportation system, causing collisions and traffic disruptions [1] [10]. Another example
would be a computer virus that may be programmed and spread across vehicles along a period of
time; consequently, all the targeted vehicles simultaneously increase their speeds. It may not be
possible to completely secure the whole system since each AV represents an access point in the
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targeted group [10]. In addition, AVs may use data generated by other vehicles (e.g., the Google
car), so “there are privacy concerns over who would have access to this data and how it might be
used” [2]. Therefore, further developments are needed with regards to AV security and privacy.
The protection against such security and privacy threats may include the removal of identifying
information, the aggregation of data within the vehicle rather than broadcasting a large amount
of raw data over a fleet of vehicles, encryption, and the use of security functions at each layer of
software and hardware [1].
Legislation is expected to impact the fast adoption of AVs [1]. For example, in Europe, the
legal framework imposes that vehicles must be controlled by a driver all time of operation, which
illegalizes at least level-three and level-four AVs. Some issues must be resolved with respect to
liability law, regulatory law, standardization, and certification [4]. An important question would
explore the case of crashes involving AVs designed such that the driver is no longer in control.
Hence, the ambiguity behind risk responsibility must be resolved before high market penetration
of AVs occurs [1].
2.3 Traffic Management near Intersections
Traffic management especially near intersections has been an important area of research. An
autonomous intersection management system is proposed in [15], where incoming vehicles are
assigned priorities by a controller to pass through USIs safely based on a defined brake-safe
state. A queue control algorithm is addressed in [16] to control the average queue size at SIs and
thereby alleviate congestion in road networks. A traffic management framework is introduced
in [17] to reduce traffic congestion at SIs by incorporating a dynamic vehicle rerouting strategy
and a TL control system. To provide emergency safety responses at SIs, a TL control system
based on deterministic and stochastic Petri Nets (PNs) is designed in [18] where TL control
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strategies are implemented to ensure the safety of traffic in cases of accidents. An Internet-of-
Things (IoT)-based platform containing three main units is introduced in [19] for emergency
vehicle priority and self-organized traffic control management at SIs.
Based on the self-organizing biological concept, a design of a self-organizing network with
a set of local rules to manage traffic priority is presented in [20] where priority is given to emer-
gency vehicles to expedite their response times. A heuristic approach is proposed in [21] to
resolve space-time conflicts such that AVs are able to pass through USIs safely with minimum
delay. A cooperative framework is introduced in [22] to allow adjacent TL control systems to
coordinate their signal-timing settings so as to globally optimize the traffic efficiency and travel
time at multiple intersections. To manage traffic at USIs, a distributed traffic management proto-
col is addressed in [23] to allow vehicles to cross safely and with high level of driver’s comfort.
A study is presented in [24] to analyze the difference based on the passing order of vehicles at
USIs between the cooperative driving of the ad hoc negotiation strategy and the planning strat-
egy. A cooperative mechanism is developed in [25] to autonomously manage the crossing of AVs
through USIs by adjusting the entry times and speeds of AVs in a certain core area.
2.4 Vehicle Speed Optimization
This section considers research conducted to address the impacts of vehicle speed optimization
on traffic efficiency near SIs. Traffic efficiency at TLs can be achieved by minimizing the idling
times of vehicles as well as stop-and-go driving. As presented next, limited research has been
conducted on centric-speed optimization (i.e., the vehicles individually and independently com-
pute their optimal speeds to meet the green-light time) to minimize the idling times and number
of stops at TLs.
An algorithm called Green Light Optimal Speed Advisory (GLOSA) has been proposed in [8]
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to minimize the number of stop times at SIs through a journey. The impacts of this algorithm
on traffic efficiency and average trip time were reported. The performance analysis of the same
algorithm is investigated again in [9] using the performance metrics of average fuel consumption
and average stop times at SIs. Vehicles equipped with this algorithm are assumed to communicate
among each other through V2V communication and with the TL through V2I communication to
gather information about the TL characteristics. Based on the time that the vehicle would take to
get to the TL plus the time remaining in the current phase, depending on the current phase light,
an optimal speed is recommended to the driver to follow.
A real-world testing and evaluation of GLOSA is presented in [26] where important factors
that are simplified in simulations but affect the results are taken into consideration. Investigat-
ing the ride comfort for buses approaching SIs, a genetic algorithm-based method is proposed
in [27], showing that the installation and use of GLOSA on buses results in significantly smoother
speeds, better ride comfort and arrival during green-light time. A modified version of GLOSA
called Driver-Centric GLOSA (DC-GLOSA) is introduced in [28]. DC-GLOSA takes into con-
sideration the acceleration and braking of vehicles to achieve better fuel saving and driving com-
fort. A multi-segment GLOSA system called R-GLOSA is proposed in [29] to provide an AV
with the optimal speed when approaching an SI assuming that the AV can have access to the TL
schedules along the whole path of travel. In large-scale simulation, the potentials and limitations
of GLOSA are investigated in [30]. A performance comparison between the single-segment
and multi-segment GLOSA approaches is addressed in [31], concluding that during free-flow
conditions, the multi-segment GLOSA achieves better results in terms of travel time and fuel
efficiency. To easily enable the application of GLOSA, a windshield mounted smart-phone pro-
totype is proposed in [32] for detecting and predicting the schedules of TLs.
An approach for a single-vehicle optimal speed computation is introduced in [33] to reduce
fuel consumption and CO2 emissions by reducing stop-and-go driving in urban areas particularly
at TLs. In this approach though, the case of a driver cruising the vehicle speed to pass a TL
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is not considered. The vehicles are assumed to communicate through V2V communication and
with the TL through V2I communication within a certain distance called the Region of Interest
(ROI). The TLs are assumed to be static with fixed cycle/phase duration. The approach proposed
in [33] is used in [34] for a single-vehicle optimal speed computation to reduce CO2 emissions.
Since [34] pays attention to the reduction of CO2 by reducing stop-and-go driving, the case
where the driver may cruise the vehicle speed to pass the TL is taken into account. The TLs are
assumed to be dynamic, and vehicles can communicate at a high reliability with the TLs through
V2I communication within a distance of 100 m.
To minimize the overall emissions of vehicles, an approach is presented in [35] to provide
the vehicle with optimal speeds toward an SI to avoid unnecessary acceleration and deceleration.
By analyzing the driving behaviour as well as the signal phasing and timing information, an
eco-driving model is introduced in [36] to provide the drivers of Electric Vehicles (EVs) with
the optimal speed profiles when approaching an SI. To minimize the energy consumed along a
certain path, an analytical model is proposed in [37] to compute a time-dependent optimal speed
profile for EVs approaching an SI.
The impacts of V2I communication, namely vehicle to TL communication, on fuel and emis-
sion reductions have been investigated in [38]. In this research, the focus is on the key factors
that influence fuel and emission reductions. These key factors are the gear choice and distance
at which the highest fuel and emission savings are achieved. It is concluded that the maximum
fuel and emission reductions can be achieved by integrating optimal speed computation with the
gear choice factor such that stops at TLs are to some extent avoided. A vehicle speed advisory
method along with a fuel consumption model to reduce fuel consumption when passing an SI are
introduced in [39]. Using the time computed to the TL and vehicle acceleration and deceleration
capabilities, the major contribution of this research is the computation of a fuel-optimal speed
profile during deceleration and acceleration phases based on the deceleration rate (i.e., when
approaching the TL) and acceleration rate (i.e., after passing the TL).
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Noticeably, the approaches and techniques proposed for optimal speed computation of vehi-
cles approaching a TL are incomplete, failing to efficiently minimize the vehicles’ idling times
and number of stops. All of these studies have focused only on single-vehicle optimal speed com-
putation, and therefore, cooperation between the vehicles and TLs to optimize vehicles’ speeds
and reduce stop-and-go driving at TLs has not been addressed at all yet.
2.5 Adaptive Cruise Control
The underlying idea of Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) is based on the theory of the Conventional
Cruise Control (CCC) system. The CCC system can maintain the speed of a vehicle at a desired
value set by the driver. Since in congested traffic conditions the CCC system becomes less useful,
a radar system was added to it, creating ACC. The addition of the sensory radar technology has
enabled the system to adjust the headway distance of a vehicle from another vehicle travelling
ahead. The ACC system decreases the need for the driver to continuously adjust speed to match
that of a vehicle ahead, and so the system is designed to reduce driving workload and increase
driver comfort and convenience [40].
There are two modes of operation for ACC (i.e., set-speed control and follow control). When
the system is in use and no vehicle is present within the predefined headway distance of the ACC
vehicle, the system functions in the set-speed control mode. The objective of this mode is to
control the speed of the vehicle to that set by the driver. If a forward vehicle is detected by the
radar, the ACC system functions in the time-gap mode (i.e., follow mode). During this mode, the
system adjusts the vehicle speed to maintain a time gap between the two vehicles. Therefore, the
ACC system reduces the driver workload by: (1) maintaining a desired preset speed; (2) applying
limited deceleration when approaching a slower vehicle ahead on the same lane; (3) keeping a
safe headway distance between the two vehicles; and (4) accelerating back to the desired preset
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speed when no slower vehicle is detected ahead [40]. However, when forming a platoon of
vehicles on the road, the ACC system has several drawbacks. String stability, which is considered
as a major barrier to ACC improving road capacity, is defined as the oscillations or perturbations
resulting from the speed variations of the leading vehicle in a platoon of vehicles [41–44]. These
speed shock-waves are amplified by the following vehicles’ drivers when pressing the braking
pedals harder and harder one after another to avoid collision when the leading vehicle brakes or
decelerates.
2.5.1 Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control
To improve the performance of ACC, V2V communication capability was added to the sys-
tem [40]. The updated version of ACC is called Cooperative Adapted Cruise Control (CACC).
CACC, which relies on V2V communication, has improved the performance of a platoon of vehi-
cles and thus, reduced the impacts of string stability [40,41,45]. Including V2V communication
has improved the performance of the system because the leading vehicle can communicate with
the rest of the platoon, transmitting its expected acceleration/deceleration rates before it performs
its actions. CACC has proven to help increase the capacity of highways only when the penetra-
tion rate of the vehicles equipped with CACC is high. There are two positive impacts of CACC
on highways. First, it reduces the inter-vehicle spacing, which improves highway capacity. V2V
communication allows vehicles equipped with CACC to travel at closer headways, resulting in
extremely small time gaps between vehicles. Second, it improves the homogeneity of traffic flow
by reducing the effects of string stability to the lowest level [4, 40, 41]. As reported in [40], ”a
cause of congestion is the occurrence of shockwaves in traffic platoons”.
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2.5.2 Platoon Formation in Urban Areas
There have been three streams of research being conducted in the field of platoon formation in
urban areas. The first one focuses on optimizing the traffic flow of platoons using dynamic traffic
signal control. A self-scheduling control model is proposed in [46] where a view of incoming
traffic is used to determine whether to extend the TL timing or not. A similar platoon-based TL
control algorithm has been introduced in [47] to optimize the traffic flow of platoons.
The second research stream focuses on platoon formation and management near Un-Signalized
Intersections (USIs). A platoon-based traffic control strategy has been proposed in [48] to im-
prove traffic efficiency at USIs, where a Petri Nets model is introduced to describe the traffic
behaviour. Similarly, a model has been introduced in [49] to manage the movement of platoons
at USIs. Other platoon management techniques to improve traffic efficiency as compared to a TL
system have been introduced in [50–53].
The last stream focuses on platoon management near SIs, where the platoon has no control
over TLs but one way communication from the TL to vehicles is available. Investigating the
effects of platoon formation near SIs has been addressed in [54], concluding that platoons on
major roadways should have the right of way even if this causes longer waiting times for vehicles
on minor roads. Experimental results for platoon modelling and management when approaching
SIs have been reported in [55], while [56] has studied the fuel-optimal strategies of platoons
departing SIs. An analytical model to predict delays of platoons at SIs has been developed
in [57].
As per the literature review conducted with respect to platoon formation in urban areas, very
few papers address platoon management near SIs [54–57]. These papers do not address the issue
of minimizing platoon-based idling times and number of stops at SIs.
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2.6 Fuzzy Logic Control
Fuzzy logic control (FLC) has proven to be a promising technological tool for vehicle automatic
speed control. A Fuzzy Logic Controller (FLCr) has been proposed in [58] to automatically
control the throttle and brake of an AV, where the output of the FLCr is the pressure on the
throttle and brake pedals. Since the objective of this study is to achieve human-like driving at low
speeds, the FLCr has been shown to perform well for smooth stop-and-go driving. However, the
effect of string stability was not reduced as V2V communication is not considered in the whole
process. A lateral and longitudinal FLCr for AVs has been introduced in [59]. The longitudinal
FLCr is used for AV speed control. The AV speed control in this research consists of two main
applications. The first is a single AV speed control, where the target speed is set by the driver
beforehand. Then, another FLCr is embedded to automatically control the vehicle’s throttle
and brake to maintain the target speed. However, there is no experimental validation of this
application. The second application is a stop-and-go driving application, where two real AVs
were used to validate the stop-and-go FLCr at low speeds (i.e., a maximum of 30 km/hour).
An algorithm using an FLCr has been proposed in [60] to automatically control the speed of an
AV. The objective of this research is to make the abrupt changes in the FLCr output smoother.
This is achieved by integrating another loop in the controller structure. This proposed algorithm
is used to automatically control the throttle pressure and thus, the acceleration of the vehicle at
high speeds (e.g., from 80 km/hour to 100 km/hour); however, the control of the brake is not
included in the process.
FLC has shown to be successful for automatically controlling the speed of a single vehicle
or a platoon of vehicles mainly to keep safe headway distances between vehicles, so it has the
same fundamental idea as the CACC but with the assumption that the whole process is fully
automated (i.e., no human intervention). Therefore, speed optimization of AVs approaching a
TL for improving traffic efficiency has not been considered in the applications of FLC.
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2.7 Traffic Light Control Systems
This section provides a review of TL control systems and their impact on managing traffic. There
are mainly two TL control systems: static TL control and dynamic TL control. The mechanism
of the former depends on using a static predetermined schedule of the phase and/or cycle duration
for each direction of the intersection. The controller of this TL system is an electro mechanical
one with a dial timer to allow repetitions of fixed phase duration intervals. Since phase duration
cannot be adapted to longer/shorter intervals, this type of TL control can achieve a limited man-
agement of traffic under normal conditions. The Dynamic TL Control System (DTLCS) consists
of two main units: a detector unit to detect the volume of traffic on roadways and a control
unit to control the signal timings by giving more congested roads longer green-light times so
that congestion at SIs is alleviated [5–7]. Some research has been conducted with respect to the
development and applications of the DTLCSs.
A design of a DTLCS that relies on the use of Infra Red-Light Emitting Diode (IR-LED)
transmitters and receivers is introduced in [61] to measure the traffic volume on junction roads.
A DTLCS based on intelligent Radio-Frequency-Identification (RFID) is developed in [62]. In-
tegrated with a certain algorithm and data base approach, this developed DTLCS can handle
multi-vehicle, multi-lane, and multi-road-junction scenarios to manage traffic. The modelling
of a DTLCS as a stochastic hybrid system is introduced in [63] where online gradient estima-
tors of a cost metric are derived with respect to the controllable light cycles. The estimators are
then used to iteratively adjust the controllable cycles to efficiently manage traffic under various
traffic conditions. A DTLCS is proposed in [64] based on a traffic flow prediction model and a
Model Predictive Control (MPC) optimization method. Using sonars for dynamic TL control,
a DTLCS is addressed in [65], performing the calculation of the green and red-light times for
different lanes based on predictive machine learning algorithm. This predictive machine learning
algorithm uses historic traffic data to reinforce the dynamic behaviour of the system.
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FLC has been shown to have the capability to apply real-life rules similar to the way humans
would control traffic flow near SIs. A FLC method applied to dynamically control the signal
timings of a TL system using a microscopic simulator is presented in [66]. A TL control system
is proposed based on FLC in [67] to model unusual traffic conditions where the duration of the
green-light phase is extended or terminated depending on the number of vehicles approaching
the green-light phase and that of vehicles waiting in the queue during the red-light phase. A
FLC-based TL system is introduced in [68] to dynamically control the traffic and pedestrians at
SIs. The number of vehicles and pedestrians are estimated using cameras mounted at the SI. A
centralized FLC-based TL system is proposed in [69] to manage traffic flow at SIs with machine
vision algorithms used to report the traffic volume on the roadways. The moving traffic to and
from nearby intersections is considered in the computations of the FLC system. A FLC system is
presented in [70] with the objective of achieving smooth traffic flow by minimizing the waiting
time of vehicles at SIs. A FLC method is applied in [71] to isolated four-roadway SIs where the
decision of extending or terminating the light signal of a certain roadway is produced using a
three-level fuzzy controller model.
To model the input-output membership functions of a FLC method for dynamic TL control,
the Mamdani fuzzy logic system is posed in [72], while the Sugeno fuzzy logic system is in-
troduced in [73]. A FLC approach for dynamic TL control is developed in [74], generating the
fuzzy logic rules based on evolutionary algorithms and using real statistical traffic data. The
design and implementation of a Smart Traffic Light (STL) based on FLC is addressed in [75]
where Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are used for traffic data collection. The input of the
FLC is the traffic quantity and waiting time of each lane, while the output is the priority degree
that determines the order of the green light for the different lanes. To overcome traffic problems
such as congestion, accidents, and irregularity, a TL control system based on FLC is proposed
in [76] where traffic volume and queue length information is obtained using WSNs and image
processing techniques. An intelligent TL control system using a statistical multiplexing method
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algorithm is proposed in [77]. The functionality of this statistical multiplexing algorithm is based
on statistical information obtained by using the conservation law of vehicles and traffic density
on the four roadways. A hierarchical WSN is installed at the intended intersection to provide the
necessary information on each roadway.
2.8 Game Theory
Game theory was introduced in the early years of the twentieth century in [78] and [79]. Several
definitions of game theory have been introduced. According to [80], game theory is “the study of
mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision makers”.
A theoretic game is defined in [81] as a “description of strategic interaction that includes the
constraints on the actions that the players can take and the players’ interests but does not specify
the actions that the players do take”. Game theory categorizes two types of games: 1) non-
cooperative games and 2) cooperative games.
Non-cooperative games provide a detailed model of strategic actions that players can take,
so these games provide the analysis of one player’s action or response given other players’ an-
ticipated actions. The case where no player wishes to unilaterally change the current strategy,
provided that the other players do not change their current strategies, is called the state of equi-
librium. These games model the best strategy or response of every player to the strategies of
other players such that an equilibrium state is found. The most known equilibrium used to repre-
sent the solution to these games is Nash Equilibrium (NE) [81]. However, in strictly competitive
games, such as zero-sum games, a pure NE does not exist. In addition, in pure strategy games
where the associated utilities are deterministic, an NE may not exist. When the players can have
mixed (i.e., stochastic/probabilistic) strategies, the expected payoffs are statistically computed.
In such cases, a mixed NE always exists, even for n-player games [79] [81].
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On the other hand, cooperative games concentrate on the modelling of outcomes that result
when the players form groups or teams. Once the players come to a situation in which every-
one gets at least as much payoff as they do without interacting or cooperating with the others,
a binding agreement between the players is made by which they are committed to implement
certain strategies. Finding a fair allocation for the joint cost or payoff is the main challenge in
cooperative games. The set of all feasible allocations is called the core. The core was first math-
ematically defined for n-player non-zero-sum games in [82]. Many issues need to be resolved,
such as determining how the cost/revenue is distributed between the players. Another issue with
cooperative games is the necessity to prove whether the game is balanced or not. If there is at
least one fair allocation to the joint cost/revenue, then the core is not empty. In this case the game
is said to be balanced [83].
2.8.1 Shortest Path and Congestion Games
Shortest-path and congestion problems have been mathematically modeled as games using game
theory. A shortest-path game with transferable utility (TU) is introduced in [84]. The focus of
this research is on the allocation of profits generated by the coalitions of players that own nodes
in a road network. The objective of players owning nodes on a path is to transport goods through
the path with a minimum cost. A shortest-path game is presented in [85] where players can own
road segments in a road network. Each player in the game receives a non-negative reward if
he/she transports a good from the source to the destination. Congestion games, first described
in [86], are viewed usually as non-cooperative resource allocation games. Congestion games
are considered to be potential games in which players’ payoffs are influenced by the resources
that players use and are dependant on the number of players that share these resources. For
instance, in symmetric-network congestion games (i.e., all the players have the same source and
destination), paths between the source and destination are considered resources that are shared by
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the travelers using them. A model is presented in [87] showing that players who share resources
(i.e., routes) can form coalitions to selfishly compete against each other to maximize their values.
If the coalitions are able to maximize the payoffs of their participants, the gain will outweigh the
losses they might cause to each other. A discussion is conducted in [88] about the similarities
between cooperative congestion games and their non-cooperative counterparts, where important
issues are demonstrated, such as the existence of and the convergence to a pure strategy NE.
2.8.2 Dynamic Traffic Light Control Games
Game theory has also been applied to the dynamic TL control problem. A model is introduced
in [89] for TL system control based on a Markov Chain game with the objective of minimizing
the queue lengths at multiple SIs. A two-player cooperation game is proposed in [90] for TL
signal timing control applied to a two-phase SI. Similar research to [89] is presented in [91]
where a non-cooperative game to model the TL signal timing control problem is introduced
based on game theory and modeled as a finite controlled Markov Chain. However, the TL model
in [91] is applied to a single SI. Based on Cournot’s Oligopoly game, a game theory model is
presented [92]. A novel game theory optimization algorithm is proposed in [93] for TL signal
timing control, where the Nash Bargaining (NB) [94] is used to find the optimal strategy of the
TL signal timing control problem.
Noticeably, the development of game theory and its applicability to the transportation prob-
lems have been limited to shortest-path, congestion and dynamic TL control games. Therefore,
game theory has not yet been developed and applied for vehicle speed optimization to allow
vehicles to cooperate with each other and with TLs, coordinating their speed actions when ap-
proaching an SI to minimize idling times and stop numbers.
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2.9 Summary
This chapter has presented a broad background on AVs, including their environmental, econom-
ical, and road safety impacts, as well as the comfort provided when using them in the transporta-
tion system. It also briefly discussed challenges and related issues associated with the growth
of AV technology and the automation of the transportation system, such as purchase and own-
ership costs, privacy and security concerns, and legislation concerns. A review of the existing
research on optimal speed computation for vehicles approaching a TL has been addressed. A
background has been presented to explore speed control models, such as ACC and CACC for
vehicle platoons with a research review focusing on vehicle platooning formation near SIs. In
addition, research that relies on the use of FLC to control the speeds of AVs by automatically
controlling the pressure on the throttle and brake was reviewed. Existing research conducted on
DTLCSs addressing a variety of techniques and approaches including FLC has been addressed.
Finally, background on game theory being applied to analyze the conflicting interests of multi-
agent systems has been conducted. Special attention has been given to the applicability of game
theory to transportation problems, and the research conducted on shortest-path, congestion, and
dynamic TL control games.
It has been shown that despite the diversity of research in the area of vehicle optimal-speed
computation and dynamic TL control, existing research does not fully solve the problem of min-
imizing the vehicles’ idling times and number of stops at SIs. Interestingly, the approaches and
models proposed for optimal speed computation to minimize the idling times and number of stops
of vehicles at TLs have been limited to considering a single-vehicle optimal speed computation.
Therefore, cooperation between multiple vehicles to minimize the idling times and number of
stops at TLs has not been addressed yet. In addition, integration of cooperative-vehicle speed
optimization with dynamic TL control such that both could cooperate and coordinate their ac-
tions to improve traffic efficiency and thus minimize the average idling times and number of
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stops has not been addressed yet. In this thesis, it is argued that a cooperative speed optimization
scenario, developed and modelled using game theory, in which AVs approaching a TL could
cooperate with one another and with the TL would be an effective mechanism to minimize the
vehicles’ idling times and number of stops, and thus improve traffic efficiency near SIs.
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Chapter 3
A Cooperative Framework for
Autonomous Vehicle Speed Optimization
In this chapter, the idling time and stop number minimization problem for AVs approaching a TL
is stated to illustrate the complexity associated with it. Then, the AV speed optimization process
is viewed as a theoretic game between players (i.e., AVs). The stability of the formulated AV
speed optimization game is also discussed. Following that, a Cooperative Speed Optimization
Framework (CSOF) is proposed to model the AV speed optimization as a cooperative process.
This framework relies on Linear Programming (LP) and game theory, consisting of three mod-
ules to address issues of AV individual rational speed optimization, information and conflict
recognition, and cooperative speed optimization decision making. Furthermore, a cooperative
bargaining model, based on the Marginal Contribution Principle (MCP), is introduced to allow
AVs to trade their rights of passing SIs with less delay. Finally, simulation is conducted to test
and validate the performance of the CSOF under various traffic conditions investigating the av-
erage idling times, average number of stops, and average energy consumption as AVs approach
SIs. The results obtained from the simulation tests are reported and discussed.
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3.1 Problem Statement
3.1.1 Signalized Roadway Intersection Setting
Consider, as an illustrative example, the two-lane four-roadway SI in Figure 3.1. For simplicity,
assume that the TL control system has a two-phase static cycle where East-West roadways are one
phase and North-South roadways are the other phase. Each phase has a signal design of Green-
Yellow-Red; however, for simplicity, the yellow-light time is assumed to be part of the green-
light-time duration. The key TL parameters are the green-light-time duration Tg, the red-light-
time duration Tr, and the TL cycle duration Tc = Tg +Tr. These parameters are assumed to be
constant, e.g., Tg = 24 sec, Tr = 36 sec, and Tc = 60 sec. Assume that there is V2I communication
such that the vehicles heading toward the TL can receive signal timing information and that every
AV is conducting speed optimization re-planning to have a chance of meeting the green-light
time.
Definition 1. Speed optimization re-planning is a game in which each AV performs speed op-
timization every time step t. There is a probability p that the AV will proceed according to the
previous strategy at time step t − 1 and a probability (1− p) that it will move to a different
strategy (i.e., adopt a different speed).
To illustrate the complexity of the problem, consider a scenario where for a certain cycle,
the arrival and maximum departure rates of a certain roadway at the TL are λ = 0.25 veh/sec
and µ = 0.333 veh/sec, respectively [95]. Therefore, on this particular roadway, the number
of AVs arriving during the red time is Narr = λTr = (0.25)(36) = 9 veh, while the maximum
number of AVs that can depart the TL during the green time is Ndep = µTg = (0.333)(24) = 8
veh. Making this setting, assume that the TL has just turned green for the East-West directions.
Consider the case of two AVs travelling on the West roadway performing speed optimization
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Figure 3.1: A simple example of a traffic light scenario.
re-planning. Taking the queue size into account, according to the computations by these AVs,
each of them can pass within the current green light. Since only one AV can pass through, the
other will experience unexpected delay, waiting for the next green light. Hence, AVs negatively
impact the objectives of each other.
This example is a simple scenario that consists of a two-player competitive game with one
TL, so the delay-time cost may not be significant. However, scaling up this example to N players,
multiple TLs along a certain path, and many other types of cost factors will result in a much more
complicated scenario. A solution to this example may require finding a cooperative agreement
between the players such that one player re-optimizes its own speed to meet the next green light
in exchange of some form of compensation, allowing the other player to pass through smoothly.
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3.1.2 Problem Formulation
Consider a group of AVs travelling within a locality with m TLs. Each AV with index AVi
contemplates speed optimization to minimize its idling times at TLs from an initial location p0i
to a final destination p f i. The trip from p0i to p f i is made on a path, P(p0i, p f i), constructed
from a set of road segments ending with TLs, L = {L1,L2, . . . ,Lm}. The speed vi(t) of each AVi
belongs to a set of feasible speeds, V = {v¯1, v¯2, . . . , v¯ f }. The cost of the trip for AVi on a road
segment L j, where j = 1,2, . . . ,m, denoted by C
L j
sv (i), explicitly models its idling time. For AVi,
the cost of travelling over road segment L j incurred by choosing a time indexed sequence of
velocities, sv, is defined as follows:
CL jsv (i) =
 ti i f stop0 i f no stop (3.1)
where ti is the idling time of AVi at the TL positioned at the end of road segment L j. The total cost
for AVi, incurred over a path P(p0i, p f i) that is composed of the road segments LP1 , . . . ,L
P
NT L ∈ L








where NT L is the number of TLs on the path P, and sv denotes the sequence of velocities for road
segment LPj . The overall aim is to minimize C
P
sv for each AVi. To provide a sub-optimal solution
to the above overall task, we follow a decentralized approach and consider each road segment
L j ∈ L of the locality separately. We propose a Time Token Allocation Algorithm (TTAA) for
the TL and a cooperative distributed conflict resolution scheme for the vehicles in each such L j.
For player AVi, the optimal speed value in the set of possible speeds may lead to a time token
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τi within the green light. The time token τi is the index of a time window assigned by the TL
using the TTAA. For player AVi, the cost associated with τi is the minimum (e.g., player AVi will
pass through the TL without stopping, CL jsv (i) = 0).
We define a cooperative speed optimization game, G. In this game, AVs with conflicting allo-
cated time tokens agree to take certain speed actions to resolve the conflict. For each player AVi,
there is a finite non-empty set of speed actions V . There is an idling time cost, CL jsv (i), associated
with each sequence of actions sv. Action sequences are associated with a preference relationship
such that CL jsv∗(i)<C
L j
sv (i) means sv∗  sv j (i.e., the sequence of actions sv∗ is preferred over that
sv as it incurs less cost).
3.2 Stability of the Speed Optimization Game
An important aspect in developing a solution to any game is understanding the game properties.
For non-cooperative games, stability is the most important property, while for cooperative games,
balancedness is the most important one. In non-cooperative games, stability reflects the existence
of a solution to the game. In other words, if an NE exists, then the game is stable. In cooperative
games, though, the existence of the solution is reflected by the balancedness. If the core (i.e.,
the set of feasible payoff/cost allocations other than which no subset of players can achieve
better outcome) is not empty, the game is balanced. In general, non-cooperative games can
be considered as part of cooperative games. Many non-cooperative games have some form of
interaction between players. For instance, when players exchange information and reveal their
payoffs prior to the game, players are cooperating to some extent. In addition, the theory of
repeated games in non-cooperative games studies and analyzes the possibility of cooperation in
perpetual relationships [96]. In such games, players may agree to swerve (i.e., lose) a game but
in return gain a reward such as a promise to allow them to win next time they play the game.
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Since there is a solution to the optimization function each AV is attempting to solve, each
AV will have an optimal action. The chosen actions of AVs are considered pure strategies, and
therefore, there always exists pure equilibrium. A pure equilibrium means that no AV wishes
to unilaterally change its optimized solution. However, this is true only for non-strictly com-
petitive games. As the game progresses, AVs compete to gain resources such that one AV’s
gain is another AV’s loss. Therefore, by considering the speed optimization re-planning game
(Definition 1), it can be proven that a solution exists.
A mixed strategy game, which always has a mixed equilibrium, is a game in which the
strategies available to the players are not deterministic but are regulated by probabilistic rules
[96] [94]. Thereby, from Definition 1, it is concluded that there is a probability distribution
over all the strategies available to every AV in the game. Hence, the speed optimization re-
planning game is a mixed strategy game for which a mixed equilibrium always exists. Thus, it
has been established that there is a solution to the formulated speed optimization game, proving
that equilibrium exists and the game is stable.
3.3 The Cooperative Speed Optimization Framework
Schematics of the CSOF we propose to solve the speed optimization re-planning game are pro-
vided in Figure 3.2. To formulate and conduct the AV speed optimization as a cooperative pro-
cess, this framework relies on LP and game theory. It consists of three modules to address (i) AV
individual rational speed optimization, (ii) information and conflict recognition, and (iii) coop-
erative speed optimization decision making. The CSOF is designed to function on multiple-lane
roadways with two essential rules. First, AVs using the CSOF in free motion can smoothly over-
take each other on the roadway to comply to certain speed actions resulting from their interaction
and cooperation. Second, under certain traffic conditions such as when overtaking is not possible,
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a safe following distance between consecutive AVs is maintained. Consecutive AVs are modeled
to maintain a minimum time gap of two seconds in order to avoid collision [98] [99]. All the
AVs are identical in length and have an average length of 5 m.
Figure 3.2: Schematic depiction of the cooperative speed optimization framework.
3.3.1 Autonomous Vehicle Speed Optimization Module
The objective of this module is to provide each player (i.e., vehicle), AVi, with the optimal speed
at every time step t. Based on the Time to Intersection T T Ii and using the TTAA, the TL may al-
locate τi to AVi, an integer value indicating the index of a time window during which AVi can pass
the intersection smoothly. The speed vi(t) of AVi at time step t is a function of the traffic density
D(L j) on road segment L j. The linearity of the relation between traffic density and speed under
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mild generic assumptions is justified in [100], concluding that as traffic concentration/density
increases, speed decreases. The maximum speed AVi can travel at, vmax, will only occur when
there are no other vehicles on the roadway. In general, the speed of AVi goes to zero as the road
reaches the maximum density, vi(t) converges to 0 as D(L j) converges to Dmax(L j). Therefore,
considering a linear relation between the traffic density and speed, the speed vi(t) of AVi with







AVi is allocated a token τi only if T T Ii falls within the upcoming green-light time, i.e., T T Ii≤
Rg or Rr < T T Ii ≤ Rr +Tg where Rg and Rr are the remaining green-light and red-light times
respectively. For AVi approaching a TL, the speed that minimizes the idling-time cost is found as
follows:
Light is Green
As AVi receives upcoming signal information from the TL, indicating that the current light is
green, there are three possible cases in terms of T T Ii and Rg:
• Case 1: T T Ii ≤ Rg. Using the current speed, AVi will be able to pass through within the
remaining green-light time. The TL allocates a time token τi to AVi. Thereby, AVi maintains
its speed to pass during the assigned time token.
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si = vi(t)





where T T Ii = di(t)/vi(t) sec, di(t) is the distance of AVi to the stop line of the TL at time
step t, si is the optimal speed of AVi at time step t +1, and vmax and vmin are the maximum
and minimum speed limits on the road segment respectively, while ai and bi represent the
lower and upper boundaries of the allocated time token respectively.





where µ is the departure rate in veh/sec.
• Case 2: Rg+Tr ≥ T T Ii > Rg. The vehicle is not allocated a time token, and the speed of
the vehicle is optimized so that T T Ii is sufficient to meet the next green light.
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si = min vi(t)










where n(t) denotes the number of vehicles currently in the queue. If the current speed does
not allow AVi to be part of the green-light time but the maximum speed of the roadway does,
the speed optimization system will accelerate the speed of AVi such that it is allocated a
token.
si = max vi(t)





• Case 3: Rg +Tr +Tg ≥ T T Ii > Rg +Tr. AVi will maintain its current speed as T T Ii leads
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AVi to be part of the green-light of the next cycle; However, AVi will not yet be allocated a
time token.
si = vi(t)




If the information received by the vehicle from the TL indicates that the current light is red, there
are three possible cases in terms of T T Ii and Rr:
• Case 1: T T Ii < Rr. AVi will not be allocated a time token, and its speed is optimized such
that it will meet the next green light.
si = min vi(t)














• Case 3: T T Ii > Rr+Tg. AVi is not allocated a time token and its speed is optimized to meet
the green-light of the next cycle.
si = min vi(t)
sub ject to :
vi(t)≤ di(t)/(Rr +Tg+Tr +Tq)




In this thesis, all the AVs involved in the cooperative process are assumed to be Electric Au-
tonomous Vehicles (EAVs); therefore, the energy consumption model presented in [101] has
been modified to compute the instant energy consumed by every AV at time step t. The problem
of battery constraint (i.e., it is not possible to recuperate energy into the battery, regenerate en-
ergy from downhill edges and during deceleration phases into the battery, if the battery is already
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fully charged) is solved by dynamically modifying and adjusting the energy cost. The energy re-
generated from downhill edges and deceleration phases is stored into the available free capacity
of the battery until the battery is full. The rest of any regenerative energy is lost. The total energy
cost consumed by AVi at time step t consists of multiple sub-costs as follows:
• Potential Consumed/Gained Energy: the potential energy ECPi (t) at time step t is con-
sumed from the battery during the uphill travel and is gained into the battery during the




[m g u(t)] (3.7)
ECPGi (t) =−η [m g u(t)] (3.8)
where η is the efficiency of AVi, m is the mass of AVi, g is the gravity factor, and u(t) is the
elevation of the road segment at time step t. In addition, we define the following parame-
ters: Cmax is the battery maximum capacity; J is the battery charge level, where J ≤Cmax;
U is the remaining free capacity of the battery, where U =Cmax− J; and ∆ is the amount
of energy consumed or gained at time step t. Therefore, this potential consumed/gained
energy takes the following value:
ECPi (t) = max{∆,−U} (3.9)
• Loss of Energy: the loss of energy at time step t, which is always consumed from the




[ fr m g ld(t)+
1
2
ρ As ar v2i (t) ld(t)] (3.10)
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where fr is the friction coefficient, ld(t) is the distance between the current and previous
locations, ρ is the air density coefficient, As is the cross sectional area of AVi, and ar is the
air drag coefficient. This loss of energy takes the following value:
EClossi (t) = ∆ (3.11)
• Acceleration/Deceleration Energy: the acceleration energy ECaci (t) at time step t is con-
sumed from the battery as AVi accelerates to a higher speed while the deceleration energy






ECdci (t) =−ηPwri tdc (3.13)
where Pwri is the power of the electric motor of AVi, while tac and tdc are the times taken
by AVi during acceleration and deceleration respectively. During acceleration/deceleration
phases, this type of energy takes the following value:
ECadi (t) = max{∆,−U} (3.14)
• Energy Consumed by On-Board Electric Devices: this energy is not path related and is
consumed directly from the battery at time step t by the on-board electric devices such as





Pedi ( j) t
ed
i ( j) (3.15)
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where Pedi ( j) is the power withdrawn at time step t by the electric device j and t
ed
i ( j) is
the time that device j takes in use.
Therefore, taking into consideration the driving style factor DS to model different driving
modes, the total energy cost consumed by AVi at time step t is computed as







3.3.2 Information and Conflict Recognition Module
In this module, AVs are recognized as rational players based on their interests, preferences and
threat to other players. If two or more players are allocated the same time token, the TL informs
them that they have a conflict. Players with conflicting time tokens communicate to share their
strategies and associated costs. Consequently, they start to negotiate to find a binding agreement
based on which they can cooperate and agree on certain speed actions. Once an agreement is
reached, all the players abide by the rules to apply those actions.
3.3.3 Cooperative Decision Making Module
In this module, the final speed optimization decisions are made. Speed assignments, resource
allocation, and cooperative speed optimization decisions are finalized. The input to this module
is in the form of various strategic speeds and associated costs. The cooperative game notion in
this module is based on the assumption that players, representing the AVs, can reach a binding
agreement with which they apply certain strategic actions. Once a decision is made, all the play-
ers involved in the game, with no exception, follow the decision. The speed optimization game
played in this module is conducted in conjunction with the information and conflict recognition
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module described earlier. The idling-time cost to a player is guaranteed not to be greater than
what it would be without cooperation, asserting the following rationality axiom.
Axiom 1. At time step t, there exists an optimal strategy vk for player AVi such that C
L j
vk (i) ≤
CL jv j (i), ∀ k, j ∈V (i.e., the cost associated with this optimal strategy is less than or equal to that
associated with any other strategy player AVi can take). However, player AVi is free to choose
any other strategy that might yield a higher cost, but only in exchange for a reward.
The above-stated axiom permits that a player may give some of its resources to other players
for the benefit of the group rather than the individual but only in exchange for a reward. This
proposed cooperative module also includes the TL rather than only the vehicles. Once an AV
is within range of the communications radio (e.g., DSRC), it will communicate with the TL to
inquire about the current light signal and queue information, and also request a time token within
the upcoming green-light time. The TL allocates time tokens to the players using Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, V IN is the AV identification number, Nq is the number of vehicles currently in
the queue, Tsd is the slot (i.e., time token) duration, and Tslot is the time token location in the TL
memory. According to this algorithm, the TL gives priority in allocating tokens to the queued
AVs. The rest of the green-light time is segmented as tokens and offered to the approaching AVs.
When two players are allocated the same time token, one of them will initiate the negotiation
to start the game. Players with conflicting tokens will share their available strategies and asso-
ciated costs, listing the costs caused by the conflict rather than the expected ones. It is assumed
that each AV has a mode property, which may take one of three values at a time: Rush Mode,
Normal Mode, or Relaxed Mode.
• Rush Mode: is used for urgent and emergency situations (e.g., the AV must be at the
hospital shortly).
• Normal Mode: is used when there is no emergency; the AV may yield the road to others.
43
• Relaxed Mode: is used when there is plenty of time. The AV would yield the road to other
vehicles comfortably.
Algorithm 1 : Single Roadway Time Token Allocation Algorithm
Input: V INi,T T Ii ; Output: τi
1: if Light is Green then
2: if (T T Ii ≤ Rg) then
3: for j = Nq +1 : Ndep do
4: a = T sd ∗ ( j−1);
5: b = T sd ∗ j;
6: if (T T Ii ≥ a & T T Ii ≤ b) then
7: T slot(1, j) =V INi;





13: τi = 0;
14: end if
15: else
16: if (T T Ii < Rr) then
17: τi = 0;
18: else if (T T Ii > Rr +(T sd ∗Nq) & T T Ii ≤ Rr +Tg) then
19: for j = Nq +1 : Ndep do
20: a = Rr +T sd ∗ ( j−1);
21: b = Rr +T sd ∗ j;
22: if (T T Ii ≥ a && T T Ii ≤ b) then
23: T slot(1, j) =V INi;





29: τi = 0;
30: end if
31: end if
Different integers, e.g., 0, 1, and 2, are used to represent the modes Relaxed, Normal, and Rush
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respectively. Players first play the game based on the mode type. The vehicle AVi using the
highest mode value, M(AVi), wins (i.e., uses the current time token), while the one using the mode
with the smaller value loses (i.e., slows down and requests a different time token). However, the
TL grants the loser a credit point and deducts a credit point from the winner. The winner of the
mode-based game is determined as
AVwinner = max(M(AV1),M(AV2)) (3.17)
If any two players have the same mode value, they will decide the winner based on the credit
points, CP(AVi), they have. The one with the most will eventually win the game. Again, a credit
point is deducted from the winner, and a credit point is granted to the loser. In this case, the
winner is determined as
AVwinner = max(CP(AV1),CP(AV2)) (3.18)
If both players have the same mode value and credit point, a random number-generation proce-
dure between the TL and the players is conducted to resolve the conflict. Each of the players as
well as the TL generates a random number. The one whose generated number, RN(AVi), is closer
to that of the TL, RN(T L), wins the current time token but loses a credit point. The other gains
a credit point and requests a different token. The winner of the game is determined as follows:
RN1 = |RN(T L)−RN(AV1)| (3.19)
RN2 = |RN(T L)−RN(AV2)| (3.20)
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AVwinner =
 AV1 i f RN1 < RN2AV2 otherwise (3.21)
Figure 3.3: Cooperative speed optimization logic
Figure 3.3 illustrates the cooperative decision-making logic used in this module. To further
clarify the cooperative speed optimization game, an example of two AVs approaching a TL is
presented next.
Example 1. Consider the problem setting of Section 3.1.1 and assume that the TL has just turned
green for the East-West directions. After communicating with the TL, the two AVs, approaching
the TL from the West, have been allocated, at time step t, the same and only-remaining time token.
Both vehicles will have only two strategies to choose from; v1(t)AVi corresponding to using the
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current time token and v2(t)AVi corresponding to minimizing speed and requesting a token within
the next green light, as summarized in Table 3.1.























(2)) , the cost is high for both of them. When either of them chooses the optimal




(2)) or (CL jv1(t)(1),C
L j
v2(t)
(2)) , the game is stable. In this case, the strategy profile
has an NE. The NE is defined based on the NE concept [81] [94] as follows:
Definition 2. A Nash Equilibrium of a strategic game G is a strategy profile in which every
player AVi ∈ G replies to the other players’ actions, using the action that incurs the minimum
cost/maximum profit.
Hence, the binding agreement between the players would enforce them to choose different strate-
gies as doing so leads to the optimal conflict-resolution solution. The player who wins the current
time token is decided as described earlier, which is based on the mode and credit point values.
The player with the poorer mode or credit point value will agree to swerve but in return get a
credit point and so have a greater chance to win next time. A numerical representation of such a
game is shown in Table 3.2.
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Multi-Phase Cooperative Speed Optimization Game
When more than two vehicles are allocated the same time token, a multi-phase cooperative proce-
dure is implemented to resolve the conflict. For each player, cooperating with every other player
makes the process extremely complex. Therefore, the multi-phase game is composed of two-
player sub-games. In each sub-game, only two players cooperate to find their acceptable joint
strategies. Then, the winners of the two-player sub-games will play another sub-game to deter-
mine the winner of the only available time token. To further clarify the multi-phase cooperative
speed optimization game, an example of four AVs is presented next.
Example 2. Let us recall Example 1 but consider a case in which four AVs are approaching the
TL from the West direction. In the first phase of this multi-phase game, two two-player sub-games
are played as described earlier; as a result, a winner is nominated from each sub-game, G1 and
G2. For instance, if AV1 and AV3 are the winners of the two-player sub-games, then the optimum
solutions resulting from these sub-games would state the strategies as follows:
V G1 = {v1(t)AV1,v2(t)AV2} (3.22)
V G2 = {v1(t)AV3,v2(t)AV4} (3.23)
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After playing the second phase of the game, if AV1 wins over AV3, the final strategy assignment
will take the following form:
V G = {v1(t+1)AV1,v2(t+1)AV2,v2(t+1)AV3,v2(t+1)AV4} (3.24)
Therefore, a credit point will be deducted from AV1, and each of the losing players, AV2, AV3 and
AV4, will receive a credit point from the TL and minimize its own speed to meet the next green
light.
3.4 Cooperative Credit-Point Bargaining
This section introduces the concept of bargaining in cooperative games to allow AVs, sharing
common interest, to come into groups and trade credit points. AVs, heading toward a TL, may
trade credit points to help players, with low credit point balance, increase their balance and thus,
maximize their chance of winning time tokens. If an AV has extra credit points or if it is not truly
in rush to pass without delay, it may offer to sell credit points to others that are in need for those
points. Hence, AVs that are in rush, but have no enough credit point balance to pass through the
TL without any delay, have a chance to buy credit points on the way and thereby, maximize their
chance of winning tokens and passing through without any delay.
The typical team-based cooperative game consists of a set of players, willing to get together
in a group, and a characteristic function, which specifies the values created by different subsets of
players. Within the context of this research, the set of all players interested to trade and perform
transactions is called the grand coalition, while the different subsets of players within the grand
coalition are called sub-coalitions. A cooperative game is a tuple of two elements (N, f ), where
N = {AV1, . . . ,AVn}, is a finite set of AVs willing to trade credit points, and f is a function that
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maps subsets S ⊆ N to their total value induced when the members of S come together to trade
credit points.
If a player is selling a credit point and receiving equal offers from multiple buyers, a random
number generation procedure is conducted to determine who buys the point. In this case, the
player whose generated number is closer to that of the seller will buy the point. The other case
is when the seller is receiving non-equal offers from multiple buyers. To clarify the conceptual
formulation of the AVs’ characteristic function of the bargaining game for the latter case, an
example is presented next.
Example 3. Consider three AVs, N = {AV1,AV2,AV3}, heading toward a TL, where AV1 is a
seller of a credit point, while AV2 and AV3 are two buyers. Consider the case that AV1 has only
one credit point to sell at $3 and each of the buyers contemplates to buy at most one credit point.
AV2 is willing to pay $5, while AV3 is willing to pay $8. The characteristic function, f , of this
game is defined as follows:
f ({AV1}) = f ({AV2}) = f ({AV3}) = 0
f ({AV1,AV2}) = 5−3 = 2
f ({AV1,AV3}) = 8−3 = 5
f ({AV2,AV3}) = 0
f ({AV1,AV2,AV3}) = 8−3 = 5
In the above formulation, it is noted that no player can create any value on its own because no
transaction can take place. When players AV1 and AV2 come together and transact, the total value
is the difference between the credit point cost and the buyer’s offer, which in this case is $2.
Players AV2 and AV3 cannot create any value when getting together since each of them is a buyer
(i.e., no transaction can take place). Finally, the value created by the grand coalition, including
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AV1, AV2 and AV3, is $5. Although there are two buyers in the game, AV1 can transact only with
one of them; consequently, the rational player would transact with the buyer that is offering a
higher price. In this case, it is AV3.
The important point now is how to fairly split or divide the overall value, $5, created by the
grand coalition, f ({N}). Bargaining in cooperative games has been recognized as a feasible
method to fairly divide the overall value created by the players [97] [102]. The solution concept
in coalitional cooperative games is the core, and bargaining can be used to find at least one
allocation or division of values, which satisfies the core conditions. In order to address how the
bargaining concept is applied to the credit point trade problem, the marginal contribution concept
is addressed.
3.4.1 The Marginal Contribution
The marginal contribution concept [103] provides the analytical reasoning of bargaining. Let
N\AVi be the subset of N that contains all the AVs except AVi. The marginal contribution of AVi
is f ({N})− f ({N\AVi}) and denoted by MCAVi . For example, the marginal contributions of the
previously defined game are
MCAV1 = f ({N})− f ({N\AV1}) = 5−0 = 5
MCAV2 = f ({N})− f ({N\AV2}) = 5−5 = 0
MCAV3 = f ({N})− f ({N\AV3}) = 5−2 = 3
Definition 3. An allocation, (xav1,xav2, ...,xavn), which is a collection of numbers representing
the division of the overall value, where xavi indicates the value received by AVi, is individually
rational if xavi ≥ f ({AVi}), ∀ i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}.
Definition 4. An allocation, (xav1 ,xav2, ...,xavn), is efficient if ∑
n
i=1 xavi = f ({N}).
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Definition 5. An individually rational and efficient allocation, (xav1,xav2, ...,xavn), satisfies the
Marginal Contribution Principle if xavi ≤MCAVi, ∀ i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}.
To see how the overall value can be fairly divided among the players, we recall Example 3. Since
player AV2 has zero marginal contribution, Definition 5 poses that this player will not receive any
value. Player AV3 has a marginal contribution of $3 ,so it cannot receive more than this value
and player AV1 can receive at most $5 of value. Since it is assumed that the players are perfectly
rational, player AV1 will sell the credit point to AV3 because it has offered a higher price. Besides,
AV3 has to pay at least $5 in order to secure the credit point; However, the price at which both
players agree to finalize the transaction may be any price between $5 and $8. Therefore, one
possible allocation of the core is ($5,$0,$0). As can be noted, bargaining does not specify all
the divisions of the overall value. Hence, all the possible allocations, which represent the core
elements, must be found.
3.4.2 The Core
The core is the solution concept of coalitional cooperative games, containing the set of all feasible
payoff/cost allocations other than which no subset or coalition of players can achieve better
outcome. The most common approach in the literature that deals with finding the core elements
is the Shaply Value [104]. However, within this research, an Artificial Intelligence (AI) technique
is used to find the core elements. Let x(S) be the sum of the values received by the AVs in the




According to [103], the core has two main properties, summarized in the following theorems.
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Theorem 1. An allocation, (xav1,xav2, ...,xavn), is part of the core if it is efficient and every subset
S of N is individually rational such that x(S)≥ f ({S}) is satisfied.
Proof. let S include only AVi such that S = {AVi} for i = 1,2, . . . ,n
Noticeably, x{AVi}= xavi both represent the values received by AVi.
Therefore, the condition x(S) ≥ f ({S}) is in fact the individual rationality condition xavi ≥
f ({AVi)}.
In addition, let the marginal contribution of a subset S of N be MCS = f ({N})− f ({N\S}).
Theorem 2. An allocation, (xav1,xav2, ...,xavn), is part of the core if it is efficient and every subset
S of N satisfies the Marginal Contribution Principle x(S)≤MCS.
Proof. Using the individual rationality condition, consider N\S
x(N\S)≥ f ({N\S}) (3.26)
x(N\S) = x(N)− x(S) (3.27)
By efficiency, we have
x(N) = f ({N}) (3.28)
Substituting (3.27) into (3.26)
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x(N)− x(S)≥ f ({N\S}) (3.29)
Substituting (3.28) into (3.29)
x(S)≤ f ({N})− f ({N\S}) = MCS (3.30)
Therefore, the core of the cooperative credit point bargaining game is defined as follows:
{(xav1,xav2 , ...,xavn) : ∑
i∈N
xavi = f ({N}), and x(S)≥ f ({S}), ∀ S ∈ N} (3.31)
where f ({S}) is the sum of the values of the members of S prior to playing the game, and x(S)
is the sum of the values received by each of the members of S. To find the core elements, we
propose that the problem is formulated as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP). The most
common CSP solving techniques are Backtracking Search and Local Search [105]. For instance,
the feasible allocations in Example 3 are the points (xav1,xav2,xav3), such that
xav1 + xav2 + xav3 = 5
sub ject to :
xav1 + xav2 ≥ 2
xav1 + xav3 ≥ 5
xav2 + xav3 ≥ 0
xav1 ≥ 0, xav2 ≥ 0, xav3 ≥ 0
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The domains of xav1 , xav2 and xav3 are
dom(xav1) = {any value between 0 and 5}
dom(xav2) = {any value between 0 and 5}
dom(xav3) = {any value between 0 and 5}
By solving this problem as a CSP, the core of the game is




xavi = f ({N}), and x(S)≥ f ({S}), ∀ S ∈ N}
Core = {($2,$0,$3)($3,$0,$2)($4,$0,$1)($5,$0,$0)}.
3.5 Simulation Tests and Results
Simulation was conducted to test and validate the performance of the proposed CSOF in a de-
tailed MATLAB environment using the concept of Object Oriented Programming (OOP). A two-
lane roadway sub-network containing three SIs was chosen in Waterloo, ON, Canada, to conduct
the simulation (Figure 3.4). The SIs are as follows: SI1, Westmount Road North with Columbia
Street West; SI2, Westmount Road North with Bearinger Road; and SI3, Northfield Drive West
with Weber Street North. Every SI has a static TL system such that TL1, TL2, and TL3 for SI1,
SI2, and SI3 respectively. Each TL control system has a two-phase cycle where the East-West
roadways are one phase and South-North roadways are the other phase. Each phase has a signal
design of Green-Yellow-Red; however, for simplicity, the yellow-light time is assumed to be part
of the green-light-time duration. To enhance safety, one second of red-light time is given to all
the roadways between every two consecutive phases.
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In order to overcome randomization and capture the real behaviour of traffic, the simulation
was run for more than three hours. The maximum and minimum speed limits on any roadway
in the network are vmax = 60 km/hour and vmin = 10 km/hour respectively where the maximum
number of vehicles a road segment may have is assumed to be 85% of the maximum density,
Dmax(L j).
Figure 3.4: A sub-network with three signalized intersections.
AVs are generated randomly into the network based on Poisson Distribution (PD) from ten
generation points determined in advance. The amount of traffic to make left/right turns or move
straightforward at every SI was specified in percentage prior to the AV generation process such
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that traffic is equally distributed throughout the network and every SI receives equal random
arrivals through its roadways. The generated AVs travel at an average speed of 50 km/hour until
they get within the activation distance (i.e., the distance at which the vehicles get within the
V2I communication range and start cooperating). The activation distance was fixed at 500 m.
The performance of the CSOF is compared to a Non-Cooperative Speed Optimization algorithm
(NCSO) (i.e., the vehicles individually and independently compute their optimal speeds). Once
they are within range, AVs start speed optimization, based on CSOF or NCSO, to catch the
green light when they arrive at the TL. The NCSO algorithm is a complete speed optimization
procedure that includes all the possible scenarios based on road and signal timing constraints.
Besides, it takes into consideration the queue lengths at every roadway when computing the
optimal speeds. Therefore, the NCSO algorithm represents a higher benchmark than the stat-of-
art in the literature, where queue lengths are not taken into account most of the time.
Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 show the total average idling time, total average number of stops,
and total average energy consumption at SI1, SI2, and SI3, comparing the CSOF to the NCSO al-
gorithm. As can be seen, in under-saturation traffic conditions (i.e., the number of arriving AVs is
within the TL capacity), the two techniques on average achieve nearly the same average values of
idling times and number of stops. As the traffic volume increases to reach over-saturation traffic
conditions (i.e., the number of arriving AVs is greater than the TL capacity), CSOF outperforms
NCSO by achieving lower average idling times and average number of stops. This is because
the conflicting passing times of vehicles through the intersections are resolved by CSOF. All the
AVs using CSOF, meant to arrive during the green-light time, are allocated time tokens before
reaching the intersections. As such, when they arrive, they are able to pass through smoothly
during their allocated times. In addition, due to the road and signal timing constraints, the AVs
that could only arrive at the intersections during the red-light times were not allocated time to-
kens before reaching the intersections. These AVs joined the queues with less waiting times.
As mentioned previously, the time needed to clear the queue is excluded from that available as
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time tokens to the approaching AVs. The figures show that as the number of AVs approaching
the intersections increases, the average idling times and number of stops become greater. The
reductions in average idling times that have been achieved by CSOF when compared to NCSO
for SI1, SI2, and SI3 are summarized in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 respectively.
Figure 3.5: Total average idling time at SI1, SI2, and SI3.
Figure 3.6: Total average number of stops at SI1, SI2, and SI3.
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Table 3.3: Reduction in average idling time at signalized intersection 1.
AVs (veh/hour) 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
NCSO (sec) 0.0344 0.6417 4.6417 5.9479 6.1433 7.5194
CSOF (sec) 0.0344 0.4188 1.2729 1.8547 2.3975 2.9791
Reduction (%) 0 35 73 69 61 60
Table 3.4: Reduction in average idling time at signalized intersection 2.
AVs (veh/hour) 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
NCSO (sec) 0.0196 0.1533 4.2899 4.9364 5.5783 6.5815
CSOF (sec) 0.0174 0.0565 0.3732 0.8435 1.3683 2.4757
Reduction (%) 11 63 91 83 75 62
Table 3.5: Reduction in average idling time at signalized intersection 3.
AVs (veh/hour) 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
NCSO (sec) 0.1174 0.1348 4.0920 4.6674 5.9448 6.1098
CSOF (sec) 0.0478 0.0978 0.4094 0.7739 1.6835 2.5674
Reduction (%) 59 27 90 83 72 58
In addition, CSOF has achieved lower average energy consumption. With CSOF, as soon as
a vehicle is allocated a time token, it maintains its speed to pass the intersection smoothly during
its allocated token. Hence, in general there are less speed variations using CSOF. To justify
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this, Figure 3.8 captures the speed trajectories of six AVs approaching SI1 from the Westmount
Road North direction from the moment they joined the activation distance until they passed the
stop line of the intersection. On average, the reductions in speed variations using CSOF are not
significant as compared to NCSO. As a result, the energy savings of AVs using CSOF have not
been significant as reported in Figure 3.7. It can be noticed in Figure 3.7 that in general, the
energy consumption of AVs does not increase as the number of AVs approaching SIs increases.
This is because it is assumed that the electric motor an AV operates is able to regenerate energy
during downhill and deceleration phases. In addition, the energy consumption model, presented
in Section 3.3.1, depends on many road and environment factors when computing the total energy
consumption at every time step; hence, the energy consumption may not have a linear relation
with the increasing number of AVs.
Figure 3.7: Total average energy consumption of vehicles approaching SI1, SI2, and SI3.
Furthermore, the total average idling time and number of stops achieved by CSOF were
investigated with respect to the V2I activation distance for SI2. It is assumed that the V2I com-
munication radio is available in a range of up to 800 m away from the intersection, so it was
varied from 200 m to 800 m in steps of 100 m. Figure 3.9 depicts the total values of average
idling times and number of stops achieved by CSOF.
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Figure 3.8: Speed trajectories of six vehicles approaching intersection 1, (a) vehicles using the CSOF, (b) vehicles
using the NCSO.
It is seen that the optimal point of activation is near 500 m. At shorter distances, some AVs
arrive during the red-light time due to insufficiency of the time available to get allocated tokens,
or reallocated tokens after playing a game, and to adjust speeds accordingly for low average
values of idling times and stop numbers. At further activation distances, the average idling times
and stop numbers slightly increase. This is due to the speed limit and signal timing constraints
the AVs have to deal with as soon as they join the activation distance and start the token allocation
process. Hence, the best allocation of tokens apparently occurs at an activation distance near 500
m.
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Figure 3.9: Activation distance analysis for intersection 2, (a) total average idling time, (b) total average number of
stops.
3.6 Summary
This chapter has presented the idling time and stop number minimization problem of AVs ap-
proaching an SI. A simple example has been addressed to demonstrate how AVs could negatively
impact each other’s plans. Then, the speed optimization process for AVs approaching a TL has
been formulated as a cooperative theoretic game. The game defined the players, their available
actions, and the costs associated with their actions. In addition, it has been proven that equilib-
rium in the formulated game exists and the game is stable. Furthermore, a cooperative speed
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optimization framework, CSOF, has been presented to formulate the AV speed optimization as
a cooperative process. This framework consists of three modules addressing issues of AV ra-
tional speed optimization, information and conflict recognition, and cooperative speed decision-
making. Thus, the proposed framework describes the problem from a single and multiple AVs’
point of view. It is argued that when AVs approaching a TL interact and cooperate with each
other, the average idling times and number of stops at the TL can be minimized, improving
traffic efficiency. Moreover, this chapter introduced an AV bargaining approach to allow AVs,
sharing common interest, to get together and trade credit points so that AVs could maximize their
chances of passing through the TL without delay. Simulation tests have been conducted to test
and validate the performance of CSOF and obtained results are reported. The CSOF was com-
pared under various traffic conditions to a non-cooperative speed optimization, NCSO, algorithm
where AVs individually conduct speed optimization. It is concluded that the CSOF outperformed





Traffic Light Control System
In this chapter, a Cooperative Autonomous Vehicle-Dynamic Traffic Light Control (CAV-DTLC)
system is introduced. The hypothetical concept behind this system is that incorporating the
dynamic TL functionality with the AVs, cooperating based on the CSOF, would achieve further
minimization of average idling times and number of stops. The proposed CAV-DTLC has the
capability to model over-saturation traffic conditions, consisting of a decision-making unit based
on a theoretic game and a control unit that relies on FLC to control the signal timings of the
TL. Simulation tests are conducted to validate the performance of the CAV-DTLC under various




Consider a two-lane four roadway SI, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. For simplicity, it is assumed
that the TL control system has a two-phase static cycle T LS = {EW,SN}, i.e., the East-West
roadways are one phase and North-South roadways are the other phase. Each phase has a signal
design of Green-Yellow-Red; however, for simplicity, the yellow-light time is assumed to be part
of the green-light time duration. The parameters of the TL are the green-light time duration Tg,
red-light time duration Tr, and TL cycle duration Tc = Tg+Tr. These parameters are assumed to
be constant, e.g., Tg = 22 sec, Tr = 28 sec, and Tc = 50 sec. We assume that the TL has fixed
maximum arrival and departure rates, λ and µ in veh/sec, respectively. Therefore, the maximum
number of AVs that can arrive at the TL from each roadway during the red time is Narr = λTr
vehs, and the maximum number of AVs that can depart the TL from each roadway during the
green-light time is Ndep = µTg vehs.
Consider a set of AVs, N = {AV1,AV2, . . . ,AVn}, travelling toward the SI from each direc-
tion and receiving signal-timing information from the TL through V2I communication. Further
assume that the AVs in N have the capability to conduct the following cooperative speed opti-
mization game:
Definition 6. The cooperative speed optimization game is a game in which a set of AVs, N =
{AV1,AV2, . . . ,AVn}, heading toward a TL, cooperate and reach a binding agreement to imple-
ment certain speed actions. In this game, an AVi ∈ N, travelling toward a TL from any direction,
either is allocated a time token τi, an integer value indicating a time window within the green
light, during which it passes the TL smoothly or agrees to slow down to meet the green light of
the next cycle in return of a compensation.
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Figure 4.1: An example scenario of autonomous vehicles approaching a static-signal-timing traffic light.
Given the above setting, the problem of interest is to minimize CL jsv (i), i.e., the idling-time
cost of every AVi ∈N at T LS that is located at the end of road segment L j, when N < Ndep for one
roadway phase, e.g., SN ∈ T LS, but N > Ndep for the other phase EW ∈ T LS such that less AVs
on EW ∈ T LS experience unexpected delay, waiting for the next green light to pass through.
To clarify the extent of the problem, consider a certain cycle where λ = 0.393 veh/sec and
µ = 0.455 veh/sec. Thus, for this particular cycle, Narr = λTr = (0.393)(28) = 11 veh, and
Ndep = µTg = (0.455)(22) = 10 veh. Now, let us consider the moment at which the TL has just
turned green for EW ∈ T LS. Let two AVs travelling on the East roadway play a cooperative speed
optimization game. Since there is only one token τi available at the TL, one of these AVs must
come to a complete stop and wait for the next green light to pass through. This simple two-AV
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example shows that cooperation between the AVs alone is not fully effective for the minimization
of idling times and stop numbers, requiring the incorporation of a dynamic TL system into the
AV-cooperative process.
4.2 Cooperative Autonomous Vehicle-Dynamic Traffic Light
Control
The objective of introducing the CAV-DTLC system is to achieve further minimization of idling
times and number of stops for AVs approaching a SI. The fundamental concept of CAV-DTLC
is to incorporate the dynamic TL functionality into the cooperative process the AVs conduct
based on the CSOF. Generally, the dynamic TL system has the ability to adjust the signal timings
according to the traffic volumes on the roadways, which has shown better results than the static
TL system.
Figure 4.2: Schematic depiction of the cooperative autonomous vehicle-dynamic traffic light control system.
As depicted in Figure 4.2, the CAV-DTLC system we propose consists of a theoretic-game
Decision-Making Unit (DMU) that decides whether the green-light time for a certain phase
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should be extended or not, and an FL-based Control Unit (CU) to generate the signal-timing
commands. It is assumed that there is reliable V2I communication capability; therefore, the TL
periodically receives information about the traffic volumes of each phase (i.e., the TL receives
reliable information about the number of vehicles, within the distance of communication, will-
ing to pass through). The decision of green-light time extension and control of the signal timings
are performed only once for every green-light phase after a certain predefined time interval has
elapsed (e.g., ∆t = 5sec) from the realization of over-saturation traffic conditions.
4.2.1 Decision Making Unit
Through the DMU, the TL decides, based on the traffic volume of a certain signal phase, whether
the green-light time should be extended or not. The decision to extend or not extend the green-
light time is made based on a game formulated as a two-player game including the Green-Light
Phase (GLP) and the Red-Light Phase (RLP). Thus, the set of players in the game is
N = {GLP,RLP} (4.1)
Generally, for each player i ∈ N, we define a non-empty set of m actions Ai = {a1, . . . ,am}
(i.e., the set of strategies available to player i), and a preference relation %i on Ai. In addition, Ai
is associated with a non-empty set of m costs Ci = {c1, . . . ,cm} such that c j ∈Ci is incurred by
taking action a j ∈ Ai, where j = 1, . . . ,m. If player i prefers a j over ak, ∀ j,k ∈ Ai, i.e., a j %i ak,
then c j ≤ ck,∀ j,k ∈Ci. Making this setting, each player i∈N, in the proposed game, can have an
action of either Extra or Not Extra AVs (i.e., Extra AVs means that there are more AVs willing to




 EXg if NGLP > NdepNEXg otherwise (4.2)
RLP =
 EXr if NRLP > NdepNEXr otherwise (4.3)
where, NGLP is the number of AVs in the GLP, NRLP is the number of AVs in the RLP, EXg means
extra AVs in the GLP, NEXg means no extra AVs in the GLP, EXr means extra AVs in the RLP,
and NEXr means no extra AVs in the RLP.
Table 4.1: Decision-making action table.
YE ⇒ E




Players and Strategies EXr NEXr
EXg (2,0) (3,0)
NEXg (0,0) (0,0)
The proposed game, described in Table 4.1, consists of two sub-games, namely, Extension
game E and No Extension game NE. In Table 4.1, the numerical values, 0, 1, 2 and 3, represent
the costs incurred by the DMU when taking the actions of E or NE based on NGLP and NRLP.
The DMU produces the final output YDMU after conducting a two-stage decision-making process.
First, each sub-game produces the strategy profile cost that represents the given input values.
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Then, the DMU produces YDMU based on the concept of Nash Equilibrium (NE) [81], comparing
the two strategy profiles resulting from the first stage, i.e., the DMU produces a strategy profile
YDMU in which each player i ∈ N replies to the action cost of the other player, c−i, using the
action that incurs the minimum cost. Thus, the final output of the DMU is
YDMU =
 (c−i,ci) if ∑(c−i,ci)≤ ∑(c− j,c j)(c− j,c j) otherwise,∀ci ∈CE&c j ∈CNE (4.4)
Figure 4.3: Block diagram of the fuzzy logic control system.
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4.2.2 Control Unit
FLC has been shown to have the capability to apply real-life rules similar to the way humans
would control traffic flow near SIs as traffic is mostly not deterministic and tends to be subjective,
approximate and qualitative. Thus, it allows inexact traffic data to be manipulated to reflect
varying degrees of truth such that more realistic signal timings can be applied. The block diagram
of the FLC system, introduced to implement the signal timings of the CAV-DTLC system, is
depicted in Figure 4.3, where the input variables to the FLC system are the number of extra AVs
in the GLP, NEXg , and the number of extra AVs in the RLP, NEXr . The output of the FLC system
is the amount by which the green-light time is extended, E.
Fuzzification
Fuzzification is used to establish the membership degrees of the FLC input/output variables,
where the crisp values are represented by membership functions. The membership function maps
the elements of the input/output variable onto numerical values in the interval [0,1]. We define a
fuzzy set including the membership function grades for each input variable. The fuzzy sets of all
















+ · · ·+ µr(EXr f )
NEXr f
(4.6)
where µg(EXgi) ∈ [0,1] represents the membership-function grade of the element NEXgi of the
fuzzy set Sg, and µr(EXri) ∈ [0,1] is the membership-function grade of the element NEXri of
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the fuzzy set Sr. Each input variable is represented by four linguistic descriptive memberships,
Zero, Few, Medium, and Many, to model the numbers of extra AVs in the GLP and RLP. The
membership functions of the fuzzy sets Sg and Sr, which are designed to be trapezoidal, are
depicted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.
Figure 4.4: Membership functions of extra vehicles in the green-light phase.
Figure 4.5: Membership functions of extra vehicles in the red-light phase.
The output of the FLC system determines by how much the green-light time is extended. We








+ · · ·+ µE(E f )
E f
(4.7)
where µE(Ei) ∈ [0,1] represents the membership-function grade of the element Ei of the fuzzy
set SE . The output variable is represented by five linguistic descriptive memberships, Zero, Very
Short, Short, Medium, and Long, to model the extension time of the green light. The membership
functions of the fuzzy set SE , designed to be trapezoidal, are depicted in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Membership functions of green light extension.
Fuzzy Inference System
We define a set of if-then fuzzy inference rules to be the essential operation of the Fuzzy Inference
System (FIS). The fuzzy inference rules connect the input-output fuzzy variables, providing a
Rule Base (RB) based on which the decision of green-light time extension is made. The rule
base of the FIS is as follows:
• Rule Base
If NEXg is Zero and NEXr is Zero, then E is Zero
If NEXg is Zero and NEXr is Few or Medium or Many, then E is Zero
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If NEXg is Few and NEXr is Zero, then E is Short
If NEXg is Medium or Many and NEXr is Zero, then E is Long
If NEXg is Few and NEXr is Few, then E is Short
If NEXg is Few and NEXr is Medium or Many, then E is Very Short
If NEXg is Medium and NEXr is Few, then E is Medium
If NEXg is Medium and NEXr is Medium or Many, then E is Short
If NEXg is Many and NEXr is Few, then E is Medium
If NEXg is Many and NEXr is Medium or Many, then E is Short
To calculate the membership grades of possible values of the fuzzy output variable E, the
Mamdani Fuzzy Model (MFM) is used in the FIS. The MFM is designed to process two input
membership grades for NEXg and NEXr , and produce one output membership grade for E. In the
MFM, the composition/aggregation of the fuzzy variables is conducted based on the max-min




where k denotes the case number of the RB, and rbt denotes the total number of cases of the RB.
Defuzzification
The output of the MFM in the FIS is a fuzzy value that is represented by a membership function.
This value is defuzzified to provide the crisp value for the extension of the green-light time, E.
The defuzzification method used in this thesis is the Centroid Method (CM) [106]. The CM
computes the center of gravity of the membership function resulting from the MFM. If the FLC
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system decides to extend the green-light time for a certain phase, the defuzzified extension time
Tex is segmented and offered as time tokens to be available to the approaching AVs. The AVs
can be allocated tokens based on the TTAA. The number of tokens Ntkn that can be added to the





where Ttkd = 1µ is the token duration in sec/veh.
4.3 Simulation Tests and Results
Simulation was conducted to investigate the performance of the proposed CAV-DTLC system.
The simulation was performed in MATLAB using the concept of OOP. The road network used
to conduct the simulation tests is the same one presented in Section 3.5 (Figure 3.4), containing
three SIs in Waterloo, ON, Canada. The SIs are SI1, SI2, and SI3 with TL systems of TL1, TL2,
and TL3 respectively. To overcome randomization in traffic behavior, the simulation was run for
more than two hours.
The performance of the CAV-DTLC was compared to those of the CSOF and NCSO. With
NCSO, there is no cooperation as the AVs individually and independently perform speed opti-
mization to meet the green-light time. With CSOF, cooperation is performed only among the
AVs, while with CAV-DTLC, the AVs cooperate among themselves and with the dynamic TL
system. A PD model was used to generate the AVs randomly into the road network. In order
to show the difference between the three techniques in terms of performance, some roadways
were given more traffic than others during the vehicle random generation process. The activation
distance of the communication radio was fixed at 500 m. The metrics used to validate the per-
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formance of the three techniques are the total average idling times and total average number of
stops at the defined SIs.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate the total average idling times and total average number of stops
with respect to the increasing traffic volume at SI1, SI2, and SI3, comparing CAV-DTLC with
CSOF and NCSO. It can be seen from the figures that the CAV-DTLC, where the dynamic TL in-
teracts and cooperates with the cooperative AVs, has outperformed the CSOF, where cooperation
is performed only between the AVs, and the NCSO, where there is no cooperation between the
AVs. This is because the unnecessary stops and delays are reduced in the CAV-DTLC scenario
via the dynamic functionality of the TLs.
Figure 4.7: Total average idling time at SI1, SI2, and SI3.
A remarkable observation is that in under-saturation traffic conditions, there is not much
difference in the total average idling times and stop numbers achieved by the three techniques.
However, as the traffic volume increases until it reaches the over-saturation traffic conditions,
the difference between the three techniques in terms of total average idling times and stop num-
bers becomes clear. Thus, the CAV-DTLC has proven to be more efficient in terms of traffic
management, achieving lower average values of idling times and stop numbers.
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Figure 4.8: Total average number of stops at SI1, SI2, and SI3.
Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 illustrate the reductions in average idling times that have been achieved
by the CAV-DTLC at SI1, SI2, and SI3 respectively as compared to the CSOF.
Table 4.2: Reduction in average idling time at signalized intersection 1.
AVs (veh/hour) 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
CSOF (sec) 0.0194 0.3798 0.9465 1.0663 1.4232 1.6202
CAV-DTLC (sec) 0.0145 0.2698 0.4177 0.1901 0.2669 0.5421
Reduction (%) 25.00 28.98 55.86 82.17 81.24 66.54
Table 4.3: Reduction in average idling time at signalized intersection 2.
AVs (veh/hour) 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
CSOF (sec) 0.0081 0.1613 0.3863 1.2516 1.6795 2.7243
CAV-DTLC (sec) 0.0065 0.1161 0.1153 0.3149 0.5619 0.7477
Reduction (%) 20 28 70 75 67 73
77
Table 4.4: Reduction in average idling time at signalized intersection 3.
AVs (veh/hour) 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
CSOF (sec) 0.0129 0.1379 0.4685 1.0489 1.5929 2.1633
CAV-DTLC (sec) 0.0032 0.1153 0.1438 0.1 0.1769 0.3013
Reduction (%) 75 16 69 90 89 86
Furthermore, Figure 4.9 depicts a snapshot of the input-output of the FIS. As can be seen in
the figure, in this case, a roadway with green-light has got 10 extra AVs, while another roadway
with red-light has got only 1 extra AV. Therefore, the green-light phase was extended by 10.5 sec.
This extension portion was segmented as tokens and made available to the AVs in the green-light
phase. Hence, the minimization of the total average idling times and number of stops has been
more efficient with the CAV-DTLC scenario.
Figure 4.9: Input-output of fuzzy inference system.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter has introduced a cooperative AV-TL control system, CAV-DTLC, consisting of
decision-making and control units. The proposed system has the ability to adjust the signal
timings under different traffic conditions. The decision-making unit is a theoretic game formu-
lated by the TL to decide whether the green-light time for a certain phase/roadway should be
extended, while a fuzzy logic controller is embedded in the control unit to determine by how
much the green-light time should be extended. The purpose of proposing the cooperative AV-TL
system is to allow the TL to be dynamic such that it interacts and cooperates with the cooperative
AVs, while the objective is to achieve further minimization of the total average idling times and
number of stops at SIs. Simulation tests were conducted to investigate the performance of the
CAV-DTLC as compared to the CSOF and NCSO. It has been demonstrated that the CAV-DTLC
outperforms the CSOF and NCSO by achieving lower average values of idling times and number
of stops under various traffic conditions.
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Chapter 5
Platoon-based Autonomous Vehicle Speed
Optimization near Signalized Intersections
This chapter addresses the AV cooperation in urban areas through platoon formation, in particular
the impacts of AV platoon formation on average idling times and number of stops at SIs. A
Platoon-based Autonomous Vehicle Speed Optimization Scheme (PAVSOS) is proposed to allow
AVs, approaching an SI, to decide in a decentralized manner whether to be part of the platoon
or not such that the average idling times and number of stops are minimized. The PAVSOS
relies on V2V and V2I communication and consists of an LP speed optimization procedure to be
conducted by the leading AV and an Intelligent Vehicle Decision Making Algorithm (IVDMA).
Simulation tests are conducted and analysis results are reported, investigating the performance of
the PAVSOS in terms of average idling times and average number of stops at an SI in comparison
with two other AV platoon scenarios.
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5.1 Problem Statement
Consider the intersection depicted in Figure 5.1 as a single-lane, four-roadway SI. For simplicity,
assume the TL control system has a two-phase static cycle T LS = {EW,SN}, where East-West
roadways are one phase and North-South roadways are the other phase. Assume that a number
of AVs connected in a platoon, Np = {AV1,AV2, . . . ,AVn}, are travelling toward the intersection
from the West roadway direction. The TL parameters are defined as follows: green-light-time
duration, Tg; red-light-time duration, Tr; and TL cycle duration, C, where C = Tg+Tr.
Figure 5.1: An example scenario of a platoon approaching a signalized intersection
As the objective of the platoon is to be connected, the problem of interest is to minimize CPit ,
i.e., the average idling-time cost of the platoon at an SI when Np > Ndep and Np ≤ Ndep. First,
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assuming that there is no V2I communication available, if the number of AVs in the platoon
is greater than the number of AVs that can pass through the intersection within the green-light
time of a single cycle (i.e.,Np > Ndep), then some of the platoon AVs will certainly stop and
experience delay. If the number of AVs in the platoon is less than or equal to those that can pass
through the intersection within the green-light time of a single cycle (i.e.,Np ≤ Ndep), then some
of the platoon AVs still may experience delay. This delay occurs because at least the leading AV
is not optimizing its speed based on the TL signal-timing information.
Second, assuming that there is V2I communication and that only the leading AV is able to
optimize its own speed based on the TL signal timing and its own Time-to-Intersection, T T IL,
such that it has a great chance to meet the green-light time when arriving at the intersection. In
this case, the following AVs are controlling their speeds based on the leader’s speed. Considering,
Np ≤ Ndep, if the leading AV takes less time to reach the intersection than the remaining green-
light time, T T IL≤Rg, not necessarily the last vehicle in the platoon does, (e.g.,T T In >Rg). As a
result, some of the platoon AVs may still stop and experience delay. Therefore, the minimization
of idling time and stop-and-go driving of a platoon of AVs is a complex problem that requires
intelligent algorithmic tools to allow the platoon-AV members to connect/disconnect based on
individual interests.
5.2 Platoon-based Autonomous Vehicle Speed Optimization
Scheme
In this Section, we propose the Platoon-based AV Speed Optimization Scheme (PAVSOS) to
minimize the average idling times of platoons of AVs approaching SIs. PAVSOS consists of an
LP speed optimization procedure to be conducted by the leading AV and an intelligent decision-
making algorithm, IVDMA, to be run by every following AV such that the platoon can have a
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greater chance of meeting the green-light time when arriving at the intersection. The objective of
the IVDMA is to enable the following AVs to reason and decide whether it is efficient for them
to be part of the platoon or not. The logic of the PAVSOS is depicted in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Logic of platoon-based autonomous vehicle speed optimization scheme
5.2.1 Platoon Formation and Control
It is assumed that the AV platoons are formed and being controlled using a unidirectional string-
stable CACC [107] [108]. Constant headway time is maintained between consecutive AVs where
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the relative distance measured from AVi to AVj is defined as
di j(t) = xi(t)− x j(t) (5.1)
5.2.2 Leading-Autonomous-Vehicle Speed Optimization
Computing the optimal speed for the platoon leading-AV, AVL, when approaching an SI is subject
to some constraints such as time to intersection, T T IL , maximum and minimum speed limits on
the roadway, vmax and vmin, current light signal, and queue size. The optimal speed of AVL at time
step t travelling toward a TL (i.e., the speed that minimizes the idling-time cost of the leader at
time step t) can be found through linear programming as follows:
Light is Green
As AVL receives upcoming signal information from the TL, indicating that the current light is
green, there are three possible cases in terms of T T IL and Rg:
• Case 1: T T IL ≤ Rg. In this case, using the current speed, AVL will be able to pass through
within the remaining green-light time.
sL = vL(t)






where T T IL = dL(t)/vL(t) sec, vL(t) is the speed of AVL at time step t, dL(t) is the distance
of AVL to the stop line of the TL at time step t, sL is the optimal speed of AVL at time step
t+1.
• Case 2: Rg+Tr ≥ T T IL > Rg. In this case, the speed of the vehicle is optimized over the
distance to the TL so that T T IL is sufficient to meet the next green light.
sL = min vL(t)





In addition, if the current speed does not allow AVL to be part of the current green-light time
but the maximum speed of the roadway does, the speed optimization system will accelerate
the speed of AVL to pass cautiously during the current green-light time.
sL = max vL(t)





• Case 3: Rg+Tr+Tg ≥ T T IL > Rg+Tr. In this case, AVL will maintain its current speed as
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T T IL leads it to be part of the next green-light time.
sL = vL(t)






If the information received by AVL from the TL indicates that the current light is red, there are
three possible cases in terms of T T IL and Rr:
• Case 1: T T IL ≤ Rr. In this case, the speed of AVL is optimized such that AVL will meet the
upcoming green-light time.
sL = min vL(t)





• Case 2: Rr < T T IL ≤ Rr +Tg. In this case, AVL will maintain its current speed to smoothly
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pass within the upcoming green-light time.
sL = vL(t)





• Case 3: T T Ii > Rr +Tg. In this case, the speed of AVL is optimized to meet the green-light
time of the next cycle.
sL = min vL(t)
sub ject to :
vL(t)≤ dL(t)/(Rr +Tg+Tr +Tq)
vL(t)≥ dL(t)/(Rr +Tr +2Tg)
vL(t)≥ vmin
vL(t)≤ vmax
5.2.3 Intelligent Vehicle Decision-Making Algorithm
In this section, the IVDMA is introduced (Algorithm 2) to allow the platoon-following AVs to
check their status as they are connected to the platoon. As such, the objective of minimizing the
average idling time for the platoon as a whole can be achieved. Through V2V communication,
AVs can share their T T Is. The IVDMA is run by every follower in the platoon in order to be able
to decide whether being part of the platoon would minimize its own idling time or not. If not,
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then the follower can disconnect from the platoon and become a leader for its followers, forming
a new platoon. The new leader then is able to communicate with the TL and run the speed
optimization linear program and thus, have a better chance of meeting the green-light time.
Algorithm 2 : Intelligent Vehicle Decision-Making Algorithm for Vehicle j
Receive information from TL
if Light is Green then














5.3 Simulation Tests and Results
In order to test and validate the performance of PAVSOS, simulation was conducted. The simula-
tion was performed in MATLAB using the concept of OOP. An SI of single-lane four-roadways
was built (Figure 5.3). The TL control system is a two-phase system with East-West roadways
as one phase and South-North roadways as another phase. The maximum and minimum speeds
allowed on the roadways are Vmax = 60 km/hour and Vmin = 10 km/hour respectively. The TL
parameters are as follows: Green-light time, Tg = 24 sec; Red-light time, Tr = 36 sec; Cycle time,
C = Tg+Tr = 60 sec. For simplicity, the yellow-light time is neglected and assumed to be part of
the green-light time. AVs are generated randomly through each roadway direction according to
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PD. AVs travel through the intersection in a straightforward movement (i.e., no left and/or right
turns allowed). In order to capture the real behaviour of traffic, the simulation was run for more
than three hours. The headway time between every two consecutive vehicles in the platoon is set
to 2 sec.
Figure 5.3: A signalized intersection of single-lane four-roadways
The performance metrics used to investigate the performance of PAVSOS are average idling
time and average number of stops. The platoon that uses PAVSOS is compared to two other
platoons. The first is a regular platoon of AVs assumed to be connected through a CACC with
no V2I communication. In this platoon, there is no speed optimization being implemented, so
it is named No Speed Optimization Platoon (NSOP). The average speed of this platoon is set
to the maximum speed allowed on the roadway, Vmax. The second is a regular platoon of AVs
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assumed to be connected through a CACC with only the leading-AV communicating with the
TL and implementing speed optimization. This platoon is named Leader only Speed Optimiza-
tion Platoon (LSOP). The platoon that functions based on PAVSOS is named Intelligent Vehicle
Speed Optimization Platoon (IVSOP).
The results are depicted in two graphs and one table. Comparing the three platoon scenar-
ios, Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the average idling times and number of stops for the whole
intersection with respect to the number of platooned AVs. The number of vehicles is varied from
a platoon of two vehicles up to twelve vehicles. As can be seen in the graphs, LSOP has out-
performed NSOP, while IVSOP has outperformed both NSOP and LSOP, achieving lower total
average idling times and number of stops. Based on the performance validation, the reductions
being achieved in terms of average idling times between IVSOP with the NSOP and LSOP are
illustrated in Table 5.1.
Figure 5.4: Total average idling time in three hours
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Figure 5.5: Total average number of stops in three hours
Table 5.1: Reduction in average idling time at the signalized intersection.
Number of Vehicles 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
IVSOP vs. NSOP (%) 100 98 96 96 94 93 92 91 91 88 81
IVSOP vs. LSOP (%) 99 60 50 50 41 41 37 45 60 59 51
5.4 Summary
This chapter has introduced a speed optimization scheme, PAVSOS, to minimize delay and stop-
and-go driving for connected AV platoons at SIs. The scheme relies on V2V and V2I commu-
nication capabilities so that vehicles could receive signal timing and queue information from
TLs. It includes a speed optimization LP technique and intelligent decision-making algorithm,
IVDMA, to allow the platoon-AV members to decide in a decentralized manner whether it is
efficient to part of the platoon or not. The platoon functioning based on PAVSOS was compared
to two other platoons to validate its performance. The first is a platoon that does not perform any
speed optimization, NSOP. The second is a platoon that has only the leading AV communicat-
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ing with the TL through V2I communication and performing speed optimization, LOSP. It has
been reported that the platoon using the PAVSOS outperformed the two other platoon scenarios,
achieving lower average idling times and number of stops.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Research
6.1 Conclusion
AVs are expected to eventually have major positive impacts on the transportation systems by
reducing driver stress and public transportation cost; improving the mobility of non-drivers, the
disabled and elderly people; reducing accident risk; increasing road capacity; and reducing park-
ing costs. However, in general, these positive impacts are expected to raise the number of vehicles
on the roads. Long idling times of AVs at SIs, which may lead to congestion, will be a major
cause of significant fuel waste and time delay. This thesis has analyzed and modelled the problem
of idling time and stop number minimization of AVs at SIs as a cooperative speed optimization
process.
Extensive background information and a comprehensive literature review on AVs in general
and vehicle speed optimization techniques in particular were addressed, showing the challenges
facing the wide adoption of AVs as well as the outstanding issues to be dealt with to achieve
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further idling time and stop number minimization and thus improve traffic efficiency at TLs. In
this regard, vehicle-centric speed optimization scenarios, explaining how AVs would act selfishly
and negatively impact each other’s goals, were demonstrated. In addition, the problem was
viewed and formulated as a cooperative game between the AVs, and game theory was proven to
have the potential to model and analyze the interaction and coordination of AVs’ strategic speed
actions.
Following the game theoretic formulation, a Cooperative Speed Optimization Framework
(CSOF) was proposed to perform the cooperative speed optimization process between AVs ap-
proaching a TL. The proposed CSOF consists of three main modules to address issues of AV-
centric speed optimization, information gathering and conflict recognition, and cooperative de-
cision making. In the AV-centric speed optimization module, a Linear Programming (LP) speed
optimization procedure is performed to provide every AV with the optimal speed such that the
idling time and number of stops at the TL are minimized. In addition, within the process of find-
ing optimal speeds, AVs can request and own time tokens within the green light during which
they can smoothly pass through. Therefore, via this module, AVs satisfy the rationality condi-
tion in the sense that each would know the optimal speed choice among all possible speeds. In
the information and conflict recognition module, AVs are recognized as rational players. AVs
with conflicting time tokens are contacted by the TL to start a negotiation process to resolve the
conflict. Thus, AVs with conflicting tokens communicate with each other to share their speed
strategies and associated costs. In the cooperative decision-making module, the final token al-
locations are made and speed assignments are finalized. AVs are assumed to abide by the rules
and can reach binding agreements, based on which, the time token conflicts are resolved. AVs
involved in a conflict would accept the need to swerve and decelerate their speeds, requesting
different time tokens, only in exchange for rewards. The TL can reward AVs that accept los-
ing the game, which maximizes their chances to win the next time they have a conflict. Thus,
the theory of the cooperative decision-making module was conceptualized and formulated as a
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repeated game, representing cooperation between the AVs in ongoing token allocation conflicts.
Furthermore, a cooperative credit point bargaining model was introduced to allow AVs to
trade credit points as they are travelling toward an SI. AVs heading toward an SI can come into
groups to sell and buy credit points. The theoretical concept of this model is to allow AVs that are
in rush to pass through without delay but have no enough credit points to buy credit points and use
them to pass through smoothly without delay. AVs with extra credit points and/or are not in rush
to pass through can sell credit points to those in need. Simulation tests were conducted to test and
validate the performance of the CSOF under various traffic conditions. A sub-network consisting
of three SIs in the neighbourhood of the University of Waterloo, ON, Canada was chosen to
conduct the simulation tests. The performance of the CSOF was compared to a Non-Cooperative
Speed Optimization (NCSO) technique with which AVs independently and individually perform
speed optimization to meet the green light of a TL. The results reported in this thesis demonstrate
the effectiveness of the CSOF by achieving lower average values of idling times and number
of stops under various traffic conditions. Due to the less speed variations resulting from AVs
using the CSOF, the CSOF has also shown less energy consumption as compared to the NCSO
technique.
Moreover, this thesis has proposed a Cooperative Autonomous Vehicle-Dynamic Traffic
Light Control (CAV-DTLC) system based on game theory and fuzzy logic control. The CAV-
DTLC system consists of a decision making and control units. It has the ability to adjust the sig-
nal timings of the TL under different traffic conditions. The decision-making unit is a theoretic
game formulated by the TL to decide whether the green-light time for a certain phase/roadway
should be extended, while a fuzzy logic controller is embedded in the control unit to determine
by how much the green-light time should be extended. The purpose of proposing the CAV-DTLC
is to allow the TL to be dynamic such that it interacts and cooperates with the cooperative AVs,
while the objective is to achieve further minimization of the average idling times and number of
stops at SIs. Simulation tests were conducted to investigate the performance of the CAV-DTLC
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as compared to the CSOF and NCSO. It has been demonstrated that the CAV-DTLC has outper-
formed the CSOF and NCSO by achieving lower average values of idling times and number of
stops under various traffic conditions.
Besides, this thesis has proposed a Platoon-based Autonomous Vehicle Speed Optimization
Scheme (PAVSOS) with the aim to minimize idling times and number of stops for connected-
AV platoons at SIs. The scheme relies on V2V and V2I communication capabilities so that
AVs could receive signal timing and queue information from TLs. It includes a speed optimiza-
tion technique and intelligent decision-making algorithm to minimize the platoon average idling
times and number of stops at SIs. Simulation tests were conducted to validate the performance
of the PAVSOS. The AV platoon functioning based on PAVSOS was compared to two other
platoon scenarios. The first is No Speed Optimization platoon (NSOP), which has no V2I com-
munication and thus, no speed optimization being implemented. The second is a Leader only
Speed Optimization Platoon (LSOP) with which only the platoon leading AV implements speed
optimization when approaching an SI to meet the green-light time. It has been reported in the re-
sults that the platoon using the PAVSOS outperformed the two other platoon scenarios, achieving
lower average idling times and number of stops.
6.2 Future Research
One important point to be investigated in the near future is the implementation and testing of the
proposed techniques under various traffic conditions using a larger road network with different
geometrical designs of SIs and various cycle/phase signal-timing settings. Since the current
geometrical design of SIs is limited to two-lane roadways with no independent left and right
lanes, SIs with independent left and right lanes will be considered. Besides, the design of the
cycle/phase timings will be developed to more complicated scenarios such that TL cycles with
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more than two phases are implemented. For instance, the traffic making left turns at an SI
might have its own phase and thereby have its own time token schedule. Having completed the
experimentation design and settings, real-life traffic data will be used to test and validate the
comparative performance between the CAV-DTLC with CSOF and NCSO.
Memory and time complexities of the proposed techniques are another important point to
investigate. It is important to verify how much memory space is needed and how much time is
taken by the TL system to manage the token allocation process. Another question to raise is how
costly it is in terms of memory space to keep a record of Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs)
for AVs passing an SI as this might be beneficial for security and safety purposes. In addition,
what ways are possible to keep the token allocation process efficient and reasonably inexpensive
in terms of memory and time usage. It is also important to investigate the computational cost of
the speed optimization, conflict resolution, and token allocation processes and find out strategies
and means to overcome any expensive computational costs.
Signal-timing coordination between neighbouring TL systems over a large area is signifi-
cantly important research point to be addressed so as to help minimize the idling times and stop
numbers of AVs at SIs. According to the novel development of techniques introduced in this the-
sis, the TL signal-timing system has been limited to a dynamic phase-based timing adjustment.
With signal-timing coordination between neighbouring TL systems, the dynamic timing adjust-
ment is performed to the cycles such that, based on traffic volume conditions, certain phases
may be expanded beyond the cycle timing limit. Therefore, a cycle-based dynamic-TL control
system will be proposed to allow TL systems over a large area to coordinate their dynamic cycle-
based signal-timing settings such that global minimization of idling times and stop numbers is
achieved. The performance analysis of such a cycle-based dynamic-TL system will be compared
with that of the techniques introduced in this thesis (i.e., CAV-DTLC and CSOF).
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